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THE SIXTH AMENDMENT’S TEXTUAL CORE
ABSTRACT

The Sixth Amendment, framed in an atmosphere of deep mistrust of a potentially
oppressive government, broadly requires that defendants be provided seven fundamental
procedural protections. Over the course of the past five decades, the scope and meaning of
these critical safeguards have undergone tremendous change, with series of expansive and
restrictive readings. Through this jurisprudential development, several provisions of the
Sixth Amendment have been interpreted in a manner that contravenes the plain meaning of
its text, rendering the Amendment far less protective of individual liberty.
After developing a comprehensive historical account of the Court’s Sixth Amendment
jurisprudence, this Article provides a framework for understanding the origins of the
textually-inconsistent readings of the Sixth Amendment, tracing them to the interplay
between the Sixth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process clause. In
addition to discussing the effects of the incorporation of the Sixth Amendment through the
Due Process clause, the Article analyses the Court’s doctrinal entanglement of these two
clauses. Then, in light of the Court’s recent landmark decisions disentangling the Sixth
Amendment, this Article proposes alternate, textually consistent constructions for the
various entanglements of the Sixth Amendment, ones that would be more faithful to the
critical role of these safeguards in protecting individual liberty.
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INTRODUCTION
The Bill of Rights, framed in an atmosphere of great mistrust of a potentially oppressive
government,3 not only enunciate broad principles limiting the powers of the federal
government, such as due process of law,4 but also include more particularized rules to
safeguard individual liberty. The Sixth Amendment, for example, guards against
unjustified deprivations of life and liberty5 by mandating that the federal government
provide seven specific procedural protections to all those accused of committing a crime.6
Over the course of the two centuries since its ratification, but particularly during the last
few decades, the scope and meaning of the Sixth Amendment’s procedural protections
have undergone significant development. While the Warren Court era was marked by the
incorporation of the Sixth Amendment and by largely expansive readings of the Sixth
Amendment, the Burger and Rehnquist Courts adopted decidedly more restrictive readings
of the Amendment.
During the course of this jurisprudential development, the Court has adopted a number of
constructions of the Sixth Amendment that plainly contravene its text and are less
protective of individual liberty. For example, contrary to textual mandate that defendants
in “all” criminal prosecutions be provided the seven procedural protections, the Court has
held that the rights to jury trial and counsel need to be provided only in a limited subset of
criminal prosecutions, and that too in differing subsets. Even the Court’s textuallyinconsistent expansive readings of the rights to public trial and compulsory process,
extending the former to pre-trial proceedings and including in the latter a right to have
witnesses testify, have ironically opened the door to textually-inconsistent restrictive
readings of the Sixth Amendment.
The textually-inconsistent, restrictive interpretations of the Sixth Amendment pose a
significant problem irrespective of what theory of constitutional interpretation one ascribes
too because constitutional text is a necessary beginning point.7 While text, including that
3

See George C. Thomas III, When Constitutional Worlds Collide: Resurrecting the Framers’ Bill of Rights
and Criminal Procedure, 100 MICH. L. REV. 145, 157 (2001); Erik G. Luna, The Models of Criminal
Procedure, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 389, 398 (1999); Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution,
100 Yale L.J. 1131 1140 (1991).
4
See Geoffrey R. Stone, The Roberts Court, Stare Decisis, and the Future of Constitutional Law, 82 Tul. L.
Rev. 1533, 1556 (2008); Michael J. Klarman, The Puzzling Resistance to Political Process Theory, 77 VA. L.
REV. 747, 769 (1991).
5
See, e.g., Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 31 (1965) (“The [jury trial] clause was clearly intended to
protect the accused from oppression by the Government . . . .”) (citation omitted).
6
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
7
This Article does not claim that the Sixth Amendment’s text provides the means to resolve all interpretive
issues. Indeed, as scholars have noted “[t]he text did not come with a user’s guide or a set of instructions for
interpretation. As noted by Judge Richard Posner, “The Constitution does not say, ‘Read me broadly,’ or,
‘Read me narrowly.”’” Luna, supra Note 3, at 422 (citation omitted). In fact, “[s]cholars generally agree
that a number of tools are available to interpret the Constitution, including the text itself, original intent,
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of the Sixth Amendment, is not always unambiguously clear, where it is, that plain
meaning constitutes a minimal baseline in protection of individual liberty.8 Whatever one
might think about the propriety of the Court’s finding that the Sixth Amendment provides
greater protections of individual liberty than the text might seem to suggest, it is difficult to
claim that the Sixth Amendment provides lesser protections of individual liberty than that
evident from a plain reading of the text.
The Court’s problematic textually-inconsistent restrictive readings of the Sixth
Amendment can be traced to the interplay between the Sixth Amendment and the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process clause. In some instances, the Court has entangled
the two constitutional provisions in the process of incorporating the Sixth Amendment
through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, leading the Court to adopt some
textually-inconsistent restrictive readings arguably in order to mitigate the impact of
incorporation on the states. In other instances, the Court has entangled the two
constitutional provisions by improperly locating expansive procedural protections in the
rules of the Sixth Amendment as opposed to deriving the same rights from the general
principle of Due Process, ironically opening the door to possible restrictive reading of the
Sixth Amendment in the future. Finally, the Court has entangled the two constitutional
provisions by improperly using Due Process interpretative methodologies to give meaning
to the Sixth Amendment, leading to textually-inconsistent restrictive readings.
In addition to providing a doctrinal framework for the textually-inconsistent restrictive
readings of the Sixth Amendment, this Article proposes alternate, textually sound
constructions in light of the recent noteworthy development in the Court’s criminal
procedure jurisprudence.9 While commentators have celebrated or decried two landmark
opinions – Apprendi v. New Jersey10 and Crawford v. Washington11 – and their progeny as
having affected fundamental change in the Court’s sentencing and confrontation clause
jurisprudence respectively, the Article suggests that these seminal decisions are more
properly understood as being part of a common enterprise – the Court’s commitment to
disentangle the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments and to reclaim the textual core of the
Sixth Amendment.

constitutional structure, judicial precedents, and contemporary values.” Id. at 394. The Article, however,
does begin with the premise that the text is the proper starting point in constitutional interpretation. See
Akhil Reed Amar, Textualism and the Bill of Rights, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1143, 1143 (1998); Laurence H.
Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional
Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221, 1223 (1995).
8
This primacy of the plain meaning text is contingent on its being consistent with the history and purposes
of the Sixth Amendment. Where a plain reading of the text conflicts with the history or purposes of the
Amendment, adopting a purely textual interpretation might be unwise. See Akhil Reed Amar, The
Constitution and Criminal Procedure: First Principles 153 (1997). None of the textual readings of the Sixth
Amendment offered in this Article are inconsistent with the purpose or history of the Sixth Amendment.
9
This Article only addresses those instances of entanglement where there is a compelling textual alternative.
There remain other entanglements not addressed here.
10
530 U.S. 466 (2000).
11
541 U.S. 36 (2004).
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In Part I, the Article sets forth a historical account of the Court’s Sixth Amendment
jurisprudence, highlighting the Court’s recent expansive and restrictive readings of the
various procedural protections that have led to the entanglement of the Sixth Amendment.
In Part II, the Article discusses the two recent seminal developments in the Court’s
criminal procedure jurisprudence that have entailed disentangling the Sixth Amendment
from the Due Process Clause. In Part III, this Article identifies the remaining textuallyinconsistent readings of the Sixth Amendment that can be traced to the Court’s
entanglement of the Sixth Amendment and proposes alternate readings, ones that are more
faithful to the text of the Sixth Amendment and more protective of individual liberty.12
I.

THE PATH TRAVELLED: A HISTORICAL ACCOUNT OF THE
COURT’S SIXTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE

The Sixth Amendment, proposed by James Madison in 1789 and ratified in 1791,13
requires the federal government to provide seven specific procedural protections to all
those it accuses of committing a crime: the right to a speedy trial; the right to a public trial;
the right to a trial before an impartial jury drawn in a prescribed manner; the right to
notice; the right of confrontation; the right to compulsory process; and the right to
assistance of counsel.14
Despite the broad reach of these procedural safeguards, for over a century after its
ratification, there were relatively few Supreme Court cases of significance involving the
Sixth Amendment.15 In fact, the only provision of the Sixth Amendment that the Court
dealt with during this period was the right to a jury trial: in a series of decisions towards
the end of the nineteenth century, the Court circumscribed the scope of the right to a jury
trial, finding that the right did not extend to the trial of petty crimes.16

12

While the Article suggests that various rights, such as the right to public pre-trial proceedings, have been
improperly located in the Sixth Amendment, it does not advocate that these rights lack constitutional bases.
On the contrary, these rights are properly located in the Due Process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. See generally Akhil Reed Amar, Double Jeopardy Law Made Simple, 106 Yale L.J. 1807
(1997) (arguing that some interpretative problems in the Court’s double jeopardy jurisprudence can be
avoided by locating those rights in the Due Process clause); Donald Dripps, Akhil Amar on Criminal
Procedure and Constitutional Law: “Here I Go Down That Wrong Road Again,” 74 N.C. L. Rev. 1559
(1996) (arguing for a robust reading of the Due Process clause).
13
Penny J. White, “He Said,” “She Said,” and Issues of Life and Death: The Right to Confrontation at
Capital Sentencing Proceedings, 19 Regent U. L. Rev. 387, 397 n.46 (2007) (citation omitted).
14
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
15
Jonathan F. Mitchell, Apprendi's Domain, 2006 Sup. Ct. Rev. 297, 342 (2006).
16
District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617 (1937); Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65 (1904); Natal
v. Louisiana, 139 U.S. 621 (1891); Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540 (1888).
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The dearth of Sixth Amendment cases during this period is not surprising. Since most
crimes were prosecuted by states to whom the Bill of Rights did not apply,17 and since
there was a significant limitation on a defendant’s ability to challenge a federal
conviction,18 there was little occasion for the Court to interpret the mandates of the Sixth
Amendment. This was true even during the Reconstruction Era despite the enactment of a
statute geared at expanding state defendants’ access to federal courts.19
While the first few decades of the twentieth century witnessed a marked evolution in the
Court’s willingness to apply Due Process limits on state criminal procedures and practices,
this jurisprudential change did not involve the Sixth Amendment, whose provisions
remained unincorporated.20 There were only two significant developments, both involving
the right to counsel – the Court read the right to counsel expansively to include an
obligation for the federal government to appoint counsel for indigent defendants21 and to
include the requirement that the assistance provided by counsel be effective.22
It was not until the Warren Court era that the Court’s Sixth Amendment jurisprudence
witnessed significant development.23 Perhaps most importantly, over the course of several
years, the Court incorporated the various provisions of the Sixth Amendment,24 finding for
17

See Barron ex rel. Tiernan v. Mayor of Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243, 8 L.Ed. 672 (1833). There were also
significant procedural hurdles preventing state court defendants from using collateral proceedings to appeal
to the Supreme Court. Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State
Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 465 (1963) (“[U]ntil 1867 (and with exceptions not relevant here) there
was no federal habeas jurisdiction to inquire into detentions pursuant to state law. Further, even after the act
of 1867 established such a jurisdiction, the Supreme Court could make no pronouncements in cases of state
detention because the Court's appellate jurisdiction under the act of 1867 was removed in 1868 and not
reestablished until 1885. Thus during the first century of the Constitution the Court had no occasion to deal
with the scope of the habeas jurisdiction for state prisoners.”).
18
Bator, supra Note 17, at 473 n.75 (“Until 1889 federal criminal cases were reviewable by the Supreme
Court only when there was a division of opinion in the circuit court on a question of law.”) (citations
omitted).
19
Bator, supra Note 17, at 478-93; Larry W. Yackle, The Habeas Hagioscope, 66 S. Cal. L. Rev. 2331, 2337
(1993) (“[O]ne of the most significant enactments of the Reconstruction era, the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867,
extended that jurisdiction to cases in which petitioners charged they were unlawfully detained by state
officials. . . . In the wake of Reconstruction, habeas helped shape the relations between the federal
government and the states. . . .); id. at 2339 (“Still, as late as the notorious Leo Frank case, Frank v. Mangum,
the Court repeated the confused boilerplate that had attached itself to the writ over the preceding century. . .
[and] federal habeas was open only if the state court had exceeded its jurisdiction-if it had ceased to act as a
court.”) (citation omitted).
20
See Larry W. Yackle, The Habeas Hagioscope, 66 S. Cal. L. Rev. 2331, 2341 (1993).
21
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
22
Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 69-70 (1942). This reading of the Sixth Amendment was reiterated
by the Court in subsequent cases. See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970).
23
The Warren Court’s “criminal procedure revolution” can be seen as a reaction both to “pervasive
legislative abdication of criminal procedure rulemaking” – for example, for more than two decades Congress
failed to take any action to implement the Court’s decision requiring the appointment of counsel for indigent
defendants – and to “disparate class and racial impact” of criminal prosecutions. Klarman, supra Note 4 at
764-67.
24
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.145 (1968) (jury trial); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967)
(compulsory process); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (speedy trial); Pointer v. Texas, 380
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the most part that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process clause guaranteed defendants
in state courts the same fundamental procedural protections guaranteed by the Framers to
defendants in federal courts.25 Ironically, this process of incorporation, properly seen as an
expansive reading of the Due Process clause as opposed to an expansive reading of the
Sixth Amendment, provided the impetus for later restrictive readings of the Sixth
Amendment.26
The Court’s Sixth Amendment jurisprudence was also significantly affected by the Warren
Court’s removal of the jurisprudential handcuffs that had been imposed on the federal
courts’ ability to remedy constitutional violations through the great writ of habeas corpus.27
The Court’s subsequent decision to subject constitutional violations – not violations of
mere ordinances or rules or statutes, but violations of the Constitution – to harmless error
analysis28 too had an important effect on the Sixth Amendment.29

U.S. 400 (1965) (confrontation); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (counsel). While the Court’s
earlier opinions in In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948) and Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948) do not make
this clear, in later years the Court has seen them as having incorporated the Sixth Amendment’s rights to
public trial and notice, respectively. See Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853 (1975). See Donald A. Dripps,
Miscarriages of Justice and the Constitution, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 635, 647 (1999) (“The Warren Court
cases indeed worked a revolution in the administration of justice in the states. The revolution, however, took
the doctrinal form of incorporating the Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
25
There have been only two exceptions to this “jot-for-jot” approach to incorporation. First, despite the
long-standing understanding that the right to a jury trial meant the right to a unanimous jury verdict, Andres
v. United States, 333 U.S. 740, 748 (1948), the Court held that this unanimity requirement was not applicable
to state prosecutions. Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972). Similarly, the Court held that while a
twelve-person jury was required in federal prosecutions, juries in state prosecutions could be composed of
fewer than twelve persons. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970). In a series of subsequent decisions, the
Court set forth the Due Process limitations on jury size and anonymity in state prosecutions. In particular,
the Court subsequently held that juries in state courts must be comprised of a minimum of six persons,
Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978), and that non-unanimous verdicts in state prosecutions would be
unconstitutional if they are the product of six-person juries. Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130 (1979).
Therefore, while both 9-3 and 5-1 jury verdicts are unconstitutional in federal prosecutions, only the latter are
unconstitutional in state prosecutions.
26
See, e.g., Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 117, 129 (1970) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court
in Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970) “dilute[d] a federal guarantee in order to reconcile the logic of
‘incorporation,’ the ‘jot-for-jot and case-for-case’ application of the federal right to the States, with the
reality of federalism.”).
27
See Stephen F. Smith, Activism as Restraint: Lessons from Criminal Procedure, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1057,
1066.
28
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) (allowing courts to deny relief even if a defendant
demonstrates a constitutional violation if the government proves, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
violation did not affect the jury’s verdict).
29
While the development of harmless error analysis might be viewed as a restrictive development from an ex
post perspective insofar as it limits the universe of defendants who would be entitled to relief upon a showing
of a constitutional violation, from an ex ante perspective it is arguably an expansive development. This is
because it makes more likely the possibility that courts will deem offending state practices to be
unconstitutional – a court after all could find that a violation occurred, but need not worry that resources
would be needlessly expended by mandating a re-trial of a clearly guilty defendant – which in turn enhances
the prescriptive value of the Constitutional rule, making future compliance with that rule more likely.
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In addition to these procedural developments affecting the Sixth Amendment, the Warren
Court era was marked by expansive substantive readings of the Sixth Amendment. For
instance, the Court read the Confrontation Clause to prohibit the use, in a joint trial, of a
non-testifying co-defendant’s confession notwithstanding the trial court’s cautionary
instructions that the confession was being admitted against the co-defendant only.30 It also
read the right to counsel expansively, extending its scope to pre-trial proceedings such as
arraignments,31 some post-arrest32 and post-indictment interrogations,33 and postindictment lineups,34 finding that it applied irrespective of a defendant’s request for
counsel,35 and creating a per se exclusionary rule prohibiting the use of testimony of some
un-counseled identifications.36 Finally, the Court read expansively the right to compulsory
process and struck down a statute that created a per se rule against the admissibility of
testimony by persons who had participated in the crime with the defendant.37
This is not to say that the Warren Court read all Sixth Amendment provisions broadly. For
example, notwithstanding the Sixth Amendment’s text that provides that the right to a jury
trial if to be provided “in all criminal prosecutions,” when the Court incorporated the right
to jury trial, it cited prior precedent to hold that the right applies only to trials of non-petty
crimes.38 While the Court subsequently read the right to jury trial to include criminal
contempt proceedings, it excluded “petty” contempt proceedings.39 Nevertheless, overall,
the Warren Court is properly seen as having taken an expansive approach to the Sixth
Amendment.
There was a fundamental shift in the Court’s criminal procedure jurisprudence during the
Burger Court era from one that stressed ensuring governmental compliance with the
procedural protections guaranteed to defendants by the Sixth Amendment to one that was
increasingly deferential of law enforcement efforts.40 This fundamental realignment of the
Court’s jurisprudential approach was evident not only in its imposition of significant
obstacles with regard to the ability of federal courts to remedy constitutional violations in
30

Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 53-54 (1961).
32
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
33
Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964). But see Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 168 (2001); Moran
v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 431 (1986); Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 180 n.16 (1985).
34
U.S. v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 236-37 (1967).
35
Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 513 (1962).
36
Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 273-74 (1967).
37
Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
38
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.145 (1968). The Burger and Rehnquist Courts re-affirmed this reading of
the right to jury trial. See Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 69 (1970); Blanton v. City of North Las
Vegas, 489 U.S. 538 (1989).
39
Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 210 (1968). See also Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147, 149-50
(1969).
40
See generally Donald A. Dripps, Beyond the Warren Court and Its Conservative Critics: Toward a Unified
Theory of Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 23 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 591 (1990); Peter Arenella, Rethinking
the Functions of Criminal Procedure: The Warren and Burger Courts’ Competing Ideologies, 72 GEO. L.J.
185 (1983); Herbert L. Packer, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION (1968).
31
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habeas proceedings,41 but also in its more restrictive view of constitutional procedural
protections in criminal cases.42
The Court’s restrictive construction of the Sixth Amendment manifested itself in different
forms. In some cases, the restrictive construction was a result of the Court’s limitation of
the scope of the right. For example, the Burger Court narrowed the class of cases to which
the right to jury trial applies, finding that it did not apply to probation revocation
hearings,43 juvenile court proceedings,44 or contempt proceedings where the sentences
imposed were subsequently reduced to the equivalent of a single term of six months.45 The
Court similarly narrowed the scope of the right to counsel: while the Court rejected states’
efforts to limit the right to counsel to petty crimes,46 it restricted the right to felonies and
those misdemeanor cases where the defendant is imprisoned.47 The Court also limited the
scope of the right to counsel by finding that it did not apply to parole or probation
revocation hearings48 or to post-arrest lineups conducted before the initiation of adverse
judicial proceedings.49
In other instances, the restrictive reading was due to the Burger Court’s incorporation
within the definitional elements of a constitutional right of a requirement that defendants
show that they were harmed; the absence of harm precluded the finding of a constitutional
violation, in essence making these rights turn on the defendant’s potential guilt or
innocence.50 For example, one of the four factors set forth by the Court for determining
whether the right to speedy trial is violated is whether the defendant can demonstrate that
the delay was prejudicial.51 Similarly, irrespective of how deficient an attorney’s
performance, so long as the attorney subjected the government’s case to meaningful
41

See Smith, supra Note 27, at 1070.
See id. (“[M]any Warren Court precedents were curtailed or at least not significantly extended, and the
Court’s application of Warren-era precedents began to take on a distinctly more prosecution-friendly
flavor.”).
43
Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S.420, 435 n.7 (1984).
44
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971).
45
Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 495-96 (1974).
46
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 40 (1972).
47
Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979). See also Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222, 223 (1980), rev’d on
other grounds by Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738 (1994).
48
Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 787 (1973).
49
Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972).
50
While the Warren Court too had required a showing of harm through the adoption of the harmless error
doctrine, that came into play only with regard to remedies – that is, only after defendants established a
constitutional violation were courts to consider whether that error was harmful enough to warrant relief. By
incorporating the harm element into the definition of the constitutional right, the Burger Court made it more
difficult to establish a violation of the right, which had the effect not only of reducing the normative value of
the right, but also of making the same textual right more meaningful for innocent defendants than for those
who might be guilty. In addition, the Burger Court’s approach also shifted the burden of proof – rather than
have the state bear the burden of showing that the constitutional violation was harmless as required by the
Warren Court’s harmless error doctrine, the Burger Court required the defendant to show the harmfulness of
the violation.
51
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972). See also United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 316 (1986).
42
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adversarial testing, a defendant cannot establish a violation of the right to counsel without
demonstrating that the counsel’s deficient performance was prejudicial.52
In a similar vein, the Burger Court read the right of confrontation restrictively by
incorporating within its definitional elements a showing of unreliability. In particular, the
Court held that the use of out of court statements offered for the truth of the matter
asserted, i.e. hearsay statements, did not offend the Confrontation Clause despite the lack
of opportunity for the defendant to confront the source of the underlying statement not
only if the statement fell within a firmly rooted hearsay evidence, but also if the statement
bore particularized indicia of reliability.53
The foregoing is not to suggest that the Burger Court uniformly read Sixth Amendment
rights restrictively. On the contrary, there were numerous notable expansive readings of
the Sixth Amendment during this period. For example, the Court enunciated a broad
vision of the right to a jury trial, finding that it included a right to have the jury venire – the
pool of potential jurors from which the petit jury is selected – reflect a fair cross section of
society.54 The Court also read the right to jury trial broadly to require that the trial court
ask race-specific questions during voir dire in some cases.55 It also read the public trial
clause expansively to include pre-trial proceedings.56 In addition, the Court re-affirmed the
primacy of the Confrontation Clause by finding that a state’s policy interest in protecting
the confidentiality of juvenile delinquency records did not supersede the right to crossexamine witnesses.57 The Court also read the right to counsel expansively58 to extend to
critical stages prior to trial,59 post-arraignment interrogations60 post-indictment
conversations with police informants61 and pre-trial psychiatric examinations;62 to include
the right to conflict-free representation;63 to include the right of the defendant to selfrepresentation;64 and to be the proper subject of a claim for habeas relief even regarding an
attorney’s incompetent representation with respect to a Fourth Amendment issue.65
52

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). But see United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984);
Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1983).
53
Ohio v Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
54
Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975). The Rehnquist Court
subsequently held that this fair-cross section requirement is limited to the venire from which the jury is
selected; it does not extend to the actual jury seated. Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474 (1990).
55
Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524 (1973); Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28 (1986). But see Ristaino v.
Ross, 424 U.S. 589 (1976); Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182 (1981).
56
Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984).
57
Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
58
The Court, however, restrictively construed the remedy for a violation of this right, holding that the denial
of counsel at critical stages would be subject to harmless error analysis rather than result in automatic
reversal. See Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1970).
59
Id.
60
Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 399 (1977).
61
Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 176 (1985); United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 274-75 (1980).
62
Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 469-71 (1981).
63
Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 350 (1980); Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 484-85 (1978).
64
Faretta v. California 422 U.S. 806, 821 (1975).
65
Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 385 (1986).
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Finally, the Court read the speedy trial clause expansively in holding that the only remedy
for a speedy trial violation is the dismissal of the indictment with prejudice.66
Nevertheless, while the Burger Court did read some provisions expansively, there was a
discernible shift towards a restrictive reading of the Sixth Amendment. Indeed,
paradoxically, a number of the Burger Court’s expansive readings actually opened the door
to future restrictive readings of the Sixth Amendment.67
The Rehnquist Court, while imposing significantly greater procedural hurdles than the
Burger Court with regard to the ability of federal courts to remedy effectively
constitutional violations in habeas proceedings,68 largely mirrored the Burger Court’s
jurisprudential approach to the Sixth Amendment – while the Court read some provisions
expansively, it read many other provisions restrictively.69
In a pair of decisions during the earlier years of the Rehnquist Court, the Court read the
Compulsory Process clause restrictively, subjugating it to policy considerations. First, the
Court held that the exclusion of testimony as a sanction for defense counsel’s deliberate
failure to comply with a discovery request did not deny the defendant’s Compulsory
Process right to have witnesses testify because “‘[t]he Sixth Amendment does not confer
the right to present testimony free from the legitimate demands of the adversarial
system.”’70 Second, the Court held that this right was not violated by the exclusion of
evidence of the defendant’s prior sexual relationship with the witness because of the
defendant’s failure to comply with notice and hearing requirement of state rape-shield
statute.71 Ironically, these restrictive readings of the Compulsory Process were predicated
on the earlier expansive reading of this Clause by the Burger Court.72
Just a year after the Rehnquist Court read the Sixth Amendment expansively in finding that
the Confrontation Clause was violated when a screen shielded a child witness from the
66

Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434, 440 (1973); Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
See infra Sections III.B. (discussing the entanglement of the Compulsory Process Clause) and III.C.
(discussing the entanglement of the Public Trial Clause).
68
See Smith, supra Note 27, at 1076 (“Although habeas corpus remains available for relitigation of the
constitutionality of state-court convictions, reversal on habeas has become a prospect that state courts simply
need not be concerned with in the vast majority of cases.”).
69
Scholars have pointed to a number of external factors as possible explanations for the Burger and
Rehnquist Courts’ adoption of a restrictive view of the Sixth Amendment. Some have pointed to increased
crime and increased politicization of crime. See Larry W. Yackle, The Habeas Hagioscope, 66 S. Cal. L.
Rev. 2331, 2349 (1993) (“The crime rate was rising, people were frightened, and society needed someone or
something to blame. Eyes fell on the Court, which was suspected of abusing its authority to protect the rights
of criminal suspects and placing law-abiding citizens at risk.”). Others have alluded to other socio-economic
developments. See Thomas III, supra Note 3. Still others have alluded to the change in jurisprudence to the
natural consequences of a change in the Court’s personnel, reflecting a change in judicial philosophy or
ideology, such as increased sensitivity to federalism concerns. See Archibald Cox, Federalism and
Individual Rights Under the Burger Court, 73 NW. U. L. REV. 1 (1978)
70
Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400 (1988).
71
Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 152 (1991).
72
See infra Section III.B. (discussing the entanglement of the Compulsory Process Clause).
67
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defendant during testimony,73 a sharply divided Court read the right to Confrontation
restrictively in a similar situation. Specifically, holding that a defendant’s right to face-toface confrontation must give way when “necessary to further an important public policy
[if] the reliability of the testimony is otherwise assured,” the Court held that the clause was
not violated by a statute that allowed a witness to be examined in a separate room from the
defendant, with the testimony being televised to the courtroom.74
The Rehnquist Court largely read the right to counsel restrictively, with some notable
expansive readings of the right during the final years of the Court. The Court read the
Sixth Amendment narrowly with respect to right to effective assistance of counsel,75 the
right to conflict free representation,76 eliciting of statements using informants,77 the
imposition of hurdles in the defendant’s ability to pay counsel’s fees,78 and the scope of the
right to counsel.79 At the same time, particularly towards the end of the Court’s era, the
Rehnquist Court did read the right to counsel broadly with respect to the scope of the right
to counsel,80 effective assistance of counsel,81 and use of statements elicited in violation of
the right to counsel.82
The Rehnquist Court’s expansive readings were most pronounced in the context of the
right of confrontation, particular as to the use of hearsay evidence,83 the right to crossexamination84 and the use of a non-testifying confession at a joint trial.85 The Court also
read the Speedy Trial clause expansively by finding a violation even where the defendant
could not show particularized harm due to the delay.86 In contrast to these expansive
readings of the Sixth Amendment, the Court largely read the right to jury trial
restrictively.87
73

Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1021 (1988).
Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990).
75
Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 4-5 (2003); Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 700 (2002).
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Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 172-74 (2002); Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 783 (1987); Wheat v.
United States, 486 U.S. 153 (1988); Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 348-49 (1990).
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Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 440, 460-61 (1986).
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Caplin & Drysdale v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 626 (1989); United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600,
615 (1989).
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McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 173-74 (1991).
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Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654 (2002); Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162 (2001).
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Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 377 (2005); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 519 (2003); Glover v.
United States, 531 U.S. 198, 203-04 (2001); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 397 (2000); Roe v. FloresOrtega, 528 U.S. 470, 483-84 (2000).
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Fellers v. United States, 540 U.S. 519, 524-25 (2004); Powell v. Texas, 492 U.S. 680, 686 (1989) (per
curiam); Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 256 (1988). But see Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402, 424
(1987).
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Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004).
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Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227, 231 (1988) (per curiam).
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Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, 192 (1998); Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186, 193 (1987). But see
Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 211 (1987).
86
Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S.647 (1992).
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Lewis v. United States, 518 U.S. 322 (1996); Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474 (1990); Blanton v. City of
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Finally, while it is far too early in the Roberts Court’s tenure to authoritatively evaluate its
approach to the Sixth Amendment, its initial decisions contravene the popularly
characterization of the Court as being less protective of individual liberty in criminal
prosecutions. While such a reputation might well be reflected in the Court’s Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence88 or its jurisprudence in capital cases,89 the Court decidedly has
read the Sixth Amendment expansively in a number of decisions involving the right to
confrontation,90 compulsory process91 and counsel. 92 It remains, however, far from clear
whether this limited jurisprudence evidences a deeply rooted commitment to an expansive
reading of the Sixth Amendment or simply a historical accident due to the particular issues
raised by the first set of Sixth Amendment cases to come before the Court.93
*

*

*

It is, thus, evident, that after a long period of dormancy, the Court’s Sixth Amendment
jurisprudence underwent significant change during the Warren, Burger and Rehnquist
Courts, with the scope and meaning of the provisions of the Sixth Amendment witnessing
a series of expansive and restrictive readings. During the course of this jurisprudential
change, the Court adopted several textually inconsistent readings of the Sixth Amendment.
For example, contrary to the textual mandate that its procedural protections be provided in
“all” prosecutions, the Court had held that the rights to counsel and jury trial only apply in
subsets of prosecutions, and that too in differing subsets.94 Moreover, going beyond the
text, the Court has expanded the scope of the compulsory process clause to include a right
to have witnesses testify and has expanded the scope of the right of public trials to include
the right to public pre-trial proceedings.95 Furthermore, by requiring that defendants show
some harm in order to demonstrate a violation the Speedy Trial, Confrontation and
Counsel Clauses, the Court contravened the textual mandate that these provisions apply in
all prosecutions, including those of persons who might well be guilty.96
Following a discussion in Section II of the Court’s two recent seminal decisions
disentangling the Sixth Amendment, in Section III, this Article discusses each of the
88

See John D. Castiglione, Hudson and Samson: The Roberts Court Confronts Privacy, Dignity, and the
Fourth Amendment, 68 La. L. Rev. 63, 64 (2007).
89
See Kenneth C. Haas, The Emerging Death Penalty Jurisprudence of the Roberts Court, 6 Pierce L. Rev.
387, 388 (2008).
90
Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678 (2008).
91
Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319 (2006).
92
Rothgery v. Gillespie County, Texas, 128 S. Ct. 2578 (2008); Indiana v. Edwards, 128 S. Ct. 2379 (2008);
United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. 2557, 2563 (2006).
93
See Geoffrey R. Stone, The Roberts Court, Stare Decisis, and the Future of Constitutional Law, 82 Tul. L.
Rev. 1533, 1534 (2008).
94
See infra Section III.A. (discussing the entanglement of the Predicate Clause).
95
See infra Sections III.B. and III.C. (discussing the entanglement of the Compulsory Process and Public
Trial clauses respectively).
96
See infra Sections III.D., III.E. and III.F. (discussing the entanglement of the Speedy Trial, Confrontation
and Counsel clauses respectively).
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Court’s textually-inconsistent readings, explaining how each is the result of the Court’s
entanglement of the Sixth Amendment with the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause.
II.

AT A CROSSROADS: THE RECENT DISENTANGLEMENT OF THE
SIXTH AMENDMENT

The past few years have witnessed two particularly critical developments in the Court’s
Sixth Amendment jurisprudence. Commentators have celebrated or decried Apprendi v.
New Jersey97 and Crawford v. Washington98 and their progeny, noting the important
changes they marked in the Court’s sentencing and Confrontation Clause jurisprudences
respectively. As discussed below, however, these two lines of cases are better seen as part
of the same effort to disentangle the Sixth Amendment from the Fourteenth Amendment
and revert to a more textually-grounded jurisprudence.
A.

THE “ALL CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS” PREDICATE

In Apprendi v. New Jersey, the Supreme Court, citing both the Due Process clause and the
Sixth Amendment, struck down a state sentencing statute that authorized a higher penalty
if the sentencing judge, rather than a jury, found that the defendant had committed a hate
crime.99 Since the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial was previously understood to apply
only at trials,100 Apprendi and its progeny have been both celebrated and criticized by
scholars for having extended that right to a subset of sentencing proceedings.101 These
cases, however, are better understood as an attempt to define the contours of the Sixth
Amendment’s unambiguous, but often forgotten predicate – namely that its procedural
protections, including the right to a jury trial, apply to “all criminal prosecutions.”102 In
other words, as discussed below, rather than extending the right to a jury trial to sentencing
proceedings, Apprendi and its progeny are better viewed as having disentangled the Sixth

97

530 U.S. 466 (2000).
541 U.S. 36 (2004).
99
530 U.S. at 490. The Court subsequently struck down sentencing guideline schemes that required the
sentencing judge to impose a higher sentence than that which would automatically follow the jury’s verdict at
trial. See Cunningham v. California, 127 S. Ct. 856 (2007); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 231
(2005); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
100
Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 459 (1984). See also Alan C. Michaels, Trial Rights at Sentencing, 81
N.C.L. REV. 1771 (2003).
101
See generally Ronald J. Allen & Ethan A. Hastert, From Winship to Apprendi to Booker: Constitutional
Command or Constitutional Blunder?, 58 STAN. L. REV. 195, 216 (2005); Keven R. Reitz, The New
Sentencing Conundrum: Policy and Constitutional Law at Cross-Purposes, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1082, 1122
(2005); Kyron Huigens, Solving the Apprendi Puzzle, 90 GEO. L.J. 387, 389 (2002); Benjamin J. Priester,
Constitutional Formalism and the Meaning of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 281 (2001);
Stephen A. Saltzburg, Due Process, History, and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 243 (2001).
102
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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and Fourteenth Amendments, locating some sentencing proceedings – those that constitute
“criminal prosecutions” – within the scope of the Sixth Amendment.
Prior to, and for a period shortly following, the adoption of the Sixth Amendment, the
underlying criminal conviction and the resulting sentence were strictly connected, with the
legislature having specified fixed punishments for every crime.103 Since the trial judge
automatically imposing a pre-determined fixed sentence after the conviction, there were no
meaningfully distinct sentencing proceedings.104 In other words, a criminal prosecution
included both the conviction and sentence. As such, the procedural protections of the
Sixth Amendment applied to determinations of sentence as much as they applied to
determinations of guilt.
The fundamental shift in sentencing policy in the nineteenth century, however, led to the
development of distinct sentencing proceedings. More than a century preceding modern
sentencing reforms, states adopted indeterminate sentencing schemes, affording trial
judges considerable discretion in fashioning a sentence.105 Under these schemes, whose
goal was the rehabilitation of offenders, judges were to make individualized sentencing
decisions that could be based on factors not involved in the determination of guilt, such as
defendants’ criminal history and personal characteristics.106
It was not until the mid-twentieth century that the Court confronted the question of what
constitutional rights were implicated by these distinct sentencing proceedings. In Williams
v New York,107 the Court faced a constitutional challenge to New York’s sentencing
procedures. A New York jury had convicted the defendant of first-degree murder and had
recommended a life sentence; the judge, however, overrode the jury’s recommendation and
imposed a death sentence, finding that the defendant was a “menace to society.”108 Since
the judge’s conclusions at sentencing were based on evidence that had not been presented
to the jury (including hearsay allegations of the defendant’s “morbid sexuality” and that
the defendant, although not convicted, had been involved in 30 other crimes), the
defendant challenged both the lack of notice about this additional evidence and the lack of
a meaningful opportunity to cross-examine adverse witnesses.109
Since Williams was a state case, it was not surprising that the defendant, and the Court,
viewed these constitutional claims solely through the lens of the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Due Process Clause. After all, the Sixth Amendment, which since the time of the adoption
103

See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 478-79 (2000).
See Susan N. Herman, The Tail that Wagged the Dog: Bifurcated Fact-Finding under the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines and the Limits of Due Process, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 289, 302 (1992) (“The facts on
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Douglas A. Berman, Distinguishing Offense Conduct and Offender Characteristics in Modern Sentencing
Reforms, 58 STAN. L. REV. 277, 278 (2005).
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337 U.S. 241 (1949).
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of the Bill of Rights had been understood to apply only to the federal government, had not
yet been incorporated via the Fourteenth Amendment and made applicable to the states.110
In finding that the imposition of the death sentence in Williams did not violate the Due
Process Clause, the Court distinguished between determinations of guilt and
determinations of sentence, finding that the latter properly were governed by different
rules.111
The Court’s provision of lesser rights at sentencing in state courts in Williams was
consonant with traditional Due Process analysis, whereby the extent of procedural
protections granted by the Due Process clause was calibrated to the type of proceeding and
interest involved.112 This does not mean that the outcome of Williams was proper –
indeed, since the right to notice is one of the most basic, elemental components of even
minimal due process, an argument can be made that the Court erred in denying the
constitutional claim in Williams. But, for purposes of this Article, the important point is
not that the outcome in Williams might or might not be proper, but rather that the Court
relied on traditional Due Process analysis, not the Sixth Amendment, in bifurcating the
underlying determinations of guilt from determinations of sentence and granting lesser
protections in the latter.113
Distinct sentencing proceedings remained the norm even as the country veered back to
determinate sentencing. Beginning in the 1960s, concerns began to be raised about both
the goals of punishment and the methods of sentencing. Specifically, “[r]esearchers and
commentators contended that efforts to rehabilitate the offenders had proved largely
ineffective and that broad judicial sentencing discretion produced unjustifiable differences
in the sentence meted out to similar defendants.”114 These concerns led to a shift towards
the retributive goals of punishment and determinate sentencing, with many states, and the
federal government, adopting “new determinate sentencing systems based on ‘guidelines’
that would help to channel the discretion of the sentencer.”115
110

See infra text accompanying Note 24 (discussing the incorporation of the Sixth Amendment by the
Warren Court in the 1960s).
111
Id. at 252.
112
See Todd Meadow, Almendarez-Torres v. United States: Constitutional Limitations on Government’s
Power to Define Crimes, 31 Conn. L. Rev. 1583 (1999). For example, administrative hearings implicate a
less robust construction of Due Process. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). Importantly, in
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Almost four decades after Williams, the Court addressed the implication of constitutional
rights by the new determinate sentencing schemes. McMillan v. Pennsylvania involved a
constitutional challenge to a state statute that required a judge to impose a mandatory
minimum sentence if a defendant possessed a firearm during the commission of certain
felonies.116 Under the statute, the requisite factfinding of firearm possession was to be
made not by the jury at the guilt phase, but rather by the judge at sentencing.117 While the
defendants raised Due Process claims regarding burdens and standards of proof, they also
raised a Sixth Amendment claim that the state scheme violated the right to a jury trial. In
summarily rejecting this claim, the Court stated simply, “We need only note that there is
no Sixth Amendment right to jury sentencing . . . .” 118
The Court’s decision in McMillan, thus, adopted the earlier, Due Process-based,
bifurcation of guilt and sentencing proceedings in the context of the Sixth Amendment,
entangling the two clauses. What was a perfectly appropriate Due Process analysis in
Williams had now been adopted in the Sixth Amendment context, with no discussion of the
text or history of the Sixth Amendment. While the Court’s holding in McMillan dealt with
state sentencing proceedings, this entanglement had important implications for federal
sentencing proceedings. As noted earlier, since a “criminal prosecution” at the time of the
Founding involved both determinations of guilt and determinations of sentence, all
provisions of the Sixth Amendment applied at that time to federal sentencing proceedings.
By now finding that the right to a jury trial did not apply to sentencing proceedings, the
Court in McMillan essentially held that sentencing proceedings fall outside the scope of
criminal prosecutions. In other words, a criminal prosecution terminates with the
determination of guilt; the subsequent determination of sentence in federal court is
governed only by the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process clause.
The Court in McMillan, moreover, adopted a formalistic approach for distinguishing
between factfindings to be made by the jury during determinations of guilt and those that
could be made by the judge at sentencing proceedings. Finding itself unable to “lay down
any ‘bright line’ test,”119 the Court gave heavy weight to whether the legislature labeled the
fact an ‘element of the offense’ or a ‘sentencing factor.’120 While it acknowledged that
“there are constitutional limits to the State's power in this regard,” the Court concluded that
“the state legislature’s definition . . . is usually dispositive.”121
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477 U.S. 79, 81 (1986).
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The McMillan majority’s formalistic approach for determining whether a factual
determination is part of the “criminal prosecution” or part of a sentencing proceeding,
while in keeping with the Rehnquist Court’s emphasis on federalism, drew dissents from
Justices Marshall, Brennan, Blackmun and Stevens, who objected to the Court’s abdication
of its responsibility to define the scope of constitutional protections. These Justices argued
that undue deference to legislatures would permit states to circumvent constitutional
requirements, including the protections of the Sixth Amendment, by simply labeling
essential facts as being ‘sentencing factors.’122
Over time, other members of the Court began to voice similar concerns. For example, in
Almendarez- Torres v. United States, Justice Scalia, in a dissent joined by Justices Stevens,
Souter and Ginsburg, found the deference to the legislature inappropriate where the statute
did not expressly indicate that the fact at issue was a “sentencing enhancement” and in fact
seemed to indicate the opposite.123 The following year, in Jones v. United States, the Court
went further – even though the structure of the statute had led both the District Court and
the Court of Appeals to find that the facts at issue were ‘sentencing enhancements,’ not
‘elements of offenses,’ the majority found that it was not an adequate indicia of legislative
intent.124
It was in dictum in Jones that the Court first enunciated the principle by which it would
independently distinguish (without undue deference to the legislature) between ‘elements
of offenses’ and ‘sentencing factors.’ In a footnote, the majority stated that “any fact (other
than prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a crime” must comply with
the notice and jury trial guarantees of the Sixth Amendment.125
This principle formed the basis for the Court’s decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey to strike
down a statute that permitted the imposition of a higher sentence if the sentencing judge
found that the underlying crime was also a hate crime.126 While the New Jersey legislature
unambiguously had set forth the hate crime provision in the statutory section titled
“Sentencing,” the Court refused to defer to the legislature. Instead, the Court, recognizing
its obligation to independently define the scope of constitutional provisions, adopted the
principle announced in dictum in Jones and held that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior
conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory
maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”127
122
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While the majority opinion in Apprendi relied on historical and policy grounds to justify its
holding, the concurring opinions provided a textual grounding for the Apprendi rule.
Justice Thomas, in an opinion joined by Justice Scalia, tethered the issue to the word
“crime” because three Constitutional provisions were predicated on this word: (1) the
Sixth Amendment right “to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation;” (2) the
Fifth Amendment right in federal cases to a grand jury indictment; and (3) the Sixth
Amendment right to jury trial.128 Since “[a]ll of these constitutional protections turn on
determining which facts constitute the “crime” – that is, which facts are the “elements” or
“ingredients” of a crime,” Justice Thomas explained, “it is critical to know which facts are
elements.”129
The textual tether for the Apprendi rule provided by Justice Thomas, while on the right
track, missed the mark. For example, the word “crime” arises in the Sixth Amendment’s
jury trial clause only insofar as to indicate the appropriate jurisdiction from which the jury
should be drawn; it does not have any implication for the scope of the jury’s factfinding
task at the trial. Instead, Justice Scalia alluded to the proper textual tether for the Apprendi
rule when he concluded in his concurring opinion that “the guarantee that “[i]n all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to . . . trial, by an impartial jury,”
has no intelligible content unless it means that all the facts which must exist in order to
subject the defendant to a legally prescribed punishment must be found by the jury.”130
Plainly stated, the Sixth Amendment’s predicate clause – “in all criminal prosecutions” –
presupposes prosecutions of “crimes” and as such, facts that constitute elements of crime
are properly adjudicated as part of the “prosecution” subject to the procedural protections
granted to defendants by Sixth Amendment. In other words, irrespective of legislative
labeling, facts that increase the statutory maximum penalty are part of the initial ‘criminal
prosecution’ not the subsequent ‘sentencing.’
Apprendi and its progeny, thus, are best seen not as having extended the Sixth Amendment
right to jury trial to a subset of sentencing proceedings, but rather as a reclaiming of that
subset of sentencing proceedings within the scope of the Sixth Amendment’s “all criminal
prosecutions” predicate clause.
B.

RIGHT OF CONFRONTATION

The Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy
the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.”131 This Confrontation
Clause, which has been understood to involve at its core four procedural safeguards (in
person testimony by witnesses; testimony given under oath; testimony that is subject to
128

530 U.S. at 499 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
Id. at 500 (Thomas, J., concurring).
130
Id. at 499 (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
131
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
129

18

THE SIXTH AMENDMENT’S TEXTUAL CORE

cross examination; and testimony where the jury can observe the witness’ demeanor),132
has broad implications for the use of out-of-court statements that are presented for the truth
of the matter asserted – i.e. hearsay evidence. At one extreme, the clause could be read as
precluding any evidence that a defendant is unable to personally confront, resulting in the
exclusion of all hearsay evidence;133 at the other extreme, it could be read narrowly as
applying only to persons who are offering testimony in court, allowing the use of any
hearsay consistent with rules of evidence.134 As discussed below, prior to the landmark
decision in Crawford v. Washington,135 the manner in which the Supreme Court attempted
to steer a middle course led to the needless entanglement of Sixth Amendment
jurisprudence with Due Process considerations.
The path to entanglement began over a century ago in Mattox v. United States when the
Court rejected a defendant’s Confrontation Clause claim in a case in which prior testimony
from two witnesses was admitted at a subsequent trial that occurred after these witnesses
had died.136 Since the defendant had been afforded a full opportunity to confront these
witnesses at the initial trial, the Court felt that “considerations of public policy and the
necessities of the case” required that the prior recorded testimony be admitted despite the
strict requirements of the Confrontation Clause.137 Notably, in dictum, the Court drew an
analogy to the admissibility of dying declarations, a category of hearsay evidence that
traditionally has been admitted despite obvious confrontation clause problems.138
The Mattox Court’s linking, albeit in dictum, of the Confrontation Clause and the rules of
evidence paved the way for the future entangling of the Sixth Amendment with due
process concerns by affirming the ability of courts to “admit out-of-court statements that
were just as reliable as those covered by the traditional exceptions without finding a
constitutional violation.”139 In Dutton v. Evans,140 for example, “Justice Stewart’s plurality
opinion brought the reliability theme to center stage.”141 The Court upheld the defendant’s
conviction even though the trial court had admitted the hearsay testimony of a jailhouse
snitch, finding that there were sufficient “indicia of reliability.”142 Notably, Justice Stewart
claimed that “the mission of the Confrontation Clause is to advance a practical concern for
the accuracy of the truth-determining process in criminal trials by assuring that ‘the trier of
fact [has] a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the prior statement.’”143
132
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A decade later, the Court fully embraced the centrality of reliability concerns in resolving
Confrontation Clause claims in Ohio v. Roberts.144 In approving the use of transcribed
testimony from a prior preliminary hearing where the defendant had been provided an
opportunity to cross-examine the witness, the Court restated its narrow view of the
“underlying purpose” of the Confrontation Clause as being merely “to augment accuracy in
the factfinding process by ensuring the defendant an effective means to test adverse
evidence.”145 The Court then explored the relationship between the Confrontation Clause
and hearsay evidence and identified two principles at work. First, for hearsay evidence to
be admissible, the declarant generally must be unavailable at trial.146 Second, the hearsay
evidence must bear “adequate indicia of reliability,” such as “fall[ing] within a firmly
rooted hearsay exception” or having “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.”147 As
one scholar concluded, “[r]eliability has become the surrogate for cross-examination.
‘Firmly rooted’ hearsay exceptions are the surrogate for reliability. The Confrontation
Clause is simply an exclusionary rule for unreliable hearsay, and the law of evidence
largely defines the rule.”148
While the Court used this reliability framework subsequently to resolve several
Confrontation Clause cases,149 some members of the Court began to voice misgivings
about the Court’s approach.150 In a prescient concurring opinion in White v. Illinois,
Justice Thomas, who was joined in the opinion by Justice Scalia, noted that “Confrontation
Clause jurisprudence has evolved in a manner that is perhaps inconsistent with the text and
history of the Clause itself.”151 The Court’s approach, Justice Thomas added, had led to
the entangling of the Sixth Amendment jurisprudence with Due Process: “reliability,”
Justice Thomas noted, “is more properly a due process concern.”152
A little over a decade later, Justice Thomas’ position gained majority support in Crawford
v. Washington.153 In an opinion written by Justice Scalia, the Court disentangled the
Confrontation Clause from Due Process considerations, stating that while “the Clause’s
144
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ultimate goal is to ensure reliability of evidence, []it is a procedural rather than a
substantive guarantee. It commands, not that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be
assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-examination.”154
Having disentangled the Sixth Amendment, the Court then offered a new approach to
Confrontation Clause issues. Drawing on the historical background of the Clause,155 the
Court concluded that the use of testimonial156 hearsay evidence would be permissible
under the Confrontation Clause only if the declarant was unavailable and the defendant had
been provided a prior opportunity for cross-examination;157 non-testimonial hearsay
evidence, on the other hand, would not be regulated by the Confrontation Clause and
would, instead, be subject only to state rules of evidence.158
Crawford, thus, “represents a sea change in the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Sixth
Amendment Confrontation Clause.”159 It marks a clear effort by the Court to disentangle
the Sixth Amendment from Due Process considerations and revert to an approach more
consistent with the Clause’s text.

III.

THE ROAD
UNDONE

AHEAD:

ENTANGLEMENTS

YET

TO

BE

The Court’s adoption of textually-inconsistent readings of the Sixth Amendment over the
course of the past few decades can be traced to the interplay between the Sixth
Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process clause. As discussed in
Section III.A. below, the Court entangled the two constitutional provisions in the process
of incorporating the Sixth Amendment, leading to a textually-inconsistent restrictive
154
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reading of the scope of the right to counsel. Sections III.B. and III.C., which address the
Compulsory Process and Public Trial clauses respectively, discuss how the Court
entangled the Sixth Amendment by improperly locating expansive procedural protections
in the particularized rules of the Sixth Amendment as opposed to deriving the same rights
from the general principle of Due Process. Finally, as discussed in Sections III.D., III.E.,
and III.F., the Court entangled the Sixth Amendment with the Due Process Clause by using
interpretative methodologies suitable for the Due Process Clause to give meaning to the
Sixth Amendment’s text. Each of the entanglements discussed below has led to a more
restrictive reading of the Sixth Amendment, rendering it less protective of individual
liberty.
A.

THE “ALL CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS” PREDICATE

The Sixth Amendment unequivocally mandates that its seven procedural protections be
provided to defendants “in all criminal prosecutions.”160 Despite this unbounded
predicate, the Court has read into the text a limitation about the scope of the right to
assistance of counsel, finding that this right is available only in limited subsets of federal
(and state) prosecutions. This construction of the right to counsel, arguably the unintended
result of incorporation, is all the more problematic in light of the Court’s earlier erroneous
limitation of the right to a jury trial to a different subset of federal (and state) prosecutions.
Thus, while the Sixth Amendment’s common predicate continues to mean in “all” criminal
prosecutions for five procedural rights, it has come to mean only in “some” criminal
prosecutions” for two procedural rights, and this “some” varies according to which of the
two procedural rights is involved. As discussed below, this textually inconsistent
construction can be traced to the entanglement of the Sixth Amendment with the Due
Process clause.
Since its ratification in 1791, the Sixth Amendment has guaranteed defendants in all
criminal prosecutions in federal court the right to the assistance of counsel.161 With respect
to state court prosecutions, on the other hand, prior to 1963, the Court had rejected the
claim that this right to counsel was applicable to the states via the Fourteenth
Amendment;162 the Court had instead conducted a case-specific review to determine
whether a state’s failure to appoint counsel violated a defendant’s due process rights.163
The Court changed direction during the early years of the Warren Court, holding that the
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right to the assistance of counsel was so “fundamental and essential to a fair trial” that it
was applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause.164
Less than a decade after Gideon v. Wainwright, the Court reaffirmed its clarion call by
rejecting states’ attempts to limit its scope to serious (that is, non-petty) offenses in
Argersinger v. Hamlin.165 In doing so, however, the Court used problematic language.
Perhaps with a desire to achieve unanimity – there was not a single dissent in Argersinger
v. Hamlin – the Court held that “no person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether
classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was represented by counsel at
trial.”166
Argersinger’s posthoc focus on whether the defendant is imprisoned after a trial without
counsel was noteworthy not only for its failure to provide meaningful pre-conviction
guidance to state courts on whether to provide defendants with counsel,167 but also because
it also opened the door seven years later to a retrenchment of the right to counsel. In a 5-4
decision, the Court in Scott v. Illinois held that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel did
not apply to all prosecutions in state courts, but only to those cases in which the defendant
was actually imprisoned.168
Mindful perhaps of Scott’s tortured reasoning, a differently constituted, yet similarly
closely split, Court later found in Alabama v. Shelton that the Sixth Amendment not only
applies to those misdemeanor cases in state courts in which the defendant is actually
imprisoned, but also in those cases where the defendant, while not actually imprisoned,
was sentenced to imprisonment and that sentence was suspended.169
The Court’s approach in Argersinger, Scott, and Shelton would pose no issue in terms of
entanglement of the Sixth Amendment if it were limited to state prosecutions. While it is
true that as a general matter, the substance of each of the Sixth Amendment’s procedural
protections is identical in state and federal prosecutions,170 the same need not be true of the
predicate “in all criminal prosecutions” clause. This predicate clause speaks not to the
substance meaning of the Sixth Amendment’s procedural protections, but to their scope.
The Framers of the Sixth Amendment were acutely concerned about the powers of a
164
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central government, quite the opposite of the concerns driving the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment. So, the Court could have held that, while the substantive meaning
of the right to counsel is identical in federal and state prosecutions, the right to counsel
applies to different sets of prosecutions: while it applies to all federal prosecutions, it only
applies to a subset of state prosecutions, those where its presence is essential to a fair
trial.171 Such a disentangled reading would have allowed the Court to adopt the current
approach to state prosecutions and would not have changed federal practice much since the
overwhelming majority of federal prosecutions are for felonies.172
The Court, however, has failed to limit its Argersinger, Scott, and Shelton approach to state
prosecutions. While not expressly addressing the issue, the Court in Nichols v. United
States implicitly assumed that an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction in federal court is
constitutional.173 Overturning its earlier decision in Baldasar v. Illinois, the Court held in
Nichols that an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction can be used in a later counseled
criminal proceeding to enhance a defendant’s sentence in federal prosecutions.174
The Court’s failure to disentangle the right to counsel, thus, has led to a textually
inconsistent construction of the Sixth Amendment: while the text unambiguously extends
the right to counsel to “all criminal prosecutions” in federal court, the Court has not
extended the right to those misdemeanor prosecutions where the defendant is not sentenced
to a term of imprisonment.
The Court’s textually inconsistent reading also is not faithful to the history of the right to
counsel. Under the common law, while a person charged with a felony or treason was
denied the assistance of counsel, the right to counsel was guaranteed in civil cases and
misdemeanors.175 The colonists also extended the right to misdemeanor cases – in almost
every instance, the colonies adopted provisions guaranteeing the right to the assistance of
counsel in all criminal proceedings.176 The Framers undoubtedly were familiar with the
extension of the right to counsel to misdemeanors under the common law and in the
colonies when they adopted the “in all criminal prosecutions” predicate in the Sixth
Amendment.
The Court’s textually inconsistent construction of the right to counsel proves all the more
problematic when considered in conjunction with the Court’s construction of the Predicate
171
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Clause with regard to the other Sixth Amendment rights. Specifically, the Court has held
that the right to jury trial does not apply to petty crimes – that is, crimes for which the
potential punishment is six months or less.177 At the same time, the Court has not qualified
the Predicate Clause with respect to the other five procedural rights in the Sixth
Amendment. As such, the same text has been endowed with three different meanings. “In
all criminal prosecutions” means the following: in the context of the right to counsel, it
means “in felony prosecutions and misdemeanor prosecutions where the defendant is
actually sentenced to a term of imprisonment;” in the context of the right to jury trial, it
means “in non-petty criminal prosecutions”; and in the context of the rights to a public
trial, a speedy trial, notice, confrontation and compulsory process, it continues to mean “in
all criminal prosecutions.”
Furthermore, insofar as the Court drew inspiration from its earlier jurisprudence limiting
the Predicate Clause in the jury trial context, such reliance was misplaced. This is because
the Court’s jury trial jurisprudence was fundamentally flawed. In concluding that the petty
trials fell outside the scope of the right to jury trial, the Court had focused on the word
“criminal” in the Predicate Clause.178 Referring to Blackstone’s definition of a “crime,”
the Court found that the word had two meanings: while a broad reading of the word
covered all criminal activity, including misdemeanors, a narrow reading of the word
covered only “offenses . . . of a deeper and more atrocious dye.”179 “[S]maller faults and
omissions of less consequence,” on the other hand, “are comprised under the gentler name
of ‘misdemeanors’ only” under the narrow reading.180 The Court then discussed the
adoption of the right to a jury trial in Article III, noting that the text of the jury trial
provision in Article III181 had been changed at the Constitutional Convention from “‘the
trial of all criminal offenses. . . . shall be by jury’” to “‘the trial of all crimes.’”182 In other
words, by adopting “crimes” instead of “all criminal offenses,” the Court found that the
Framers intended to adopt the narrow definition of “crime,” the one that excluded
misdemeanor offenses from its scope.
The Court’s reading of the text, however, was fundamentally flawed. First, “Blackstone
himself impeache[d] [the narrow definition] as improper and g[ave] full recognition to the
broad meaning of the word.”183 Indeed, since the narrow definition was used perhaps
occasionally, with the broad definition of “crime” being used more regularly, the use of
narrow definition would have been clear only if it was juxtaposed in the text with a word
177
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such as “misdemeanors.”184 Moreover, even if the word “crime” had two viable meanings
and even if the Framers had selected the narrow definition at the Constitutional
Convention, the Framers did no such thing when it came to the Sixth Amendment.
Instead, the Sixth Amendment’s “criminal prosecutions” language mirrors the original
“criminal offenses” language in Article III, which the Court had seen as embodying the
broader definition of “crime.” Finally, the use of the word “all” in the Sixth Amendment
predicate also undermines the notion that the predicate was meant to be limited to a subset
of prosecutions.185
In addition, the Court’s problematic interpretation of the predicate clause in the jury trial
context also stemmed from the Court’s misreading of the historical record. In a series of
cases long before the right to a jury trial was incorporated to the states, the Court had
noted, often in dicta, that the common law and the practices of the colonies and early states
showed that petty trials were often tried summarily and that the right to a jury trial,
therefore, was not meant to extend to petty crimes.186 The historical record, however, does
not support such a thesis. While it is undoubtedly true that petty crimes were subject to
summary trials during the common law, so were non-petty crimes.187 Moreover, as far as
the colonies go, many either had no constitutional right to a jury trial or had limited that
right to serious crimes or even capital cases.188 Furthermore, where summary trials did
take place, “the power to dispense with the criminal jury had been reserved to the
legislature . . . .”189
Most importantly, whatever the practice of the common law, colonies or early states, the
concerns that led to the adoption of the Bill of rights were directed narrowly at a central
government, one that was feared might become potentially oppressive or tyrannical. That
is, the federal government stood on different footing and, even if states, which were
primarily responsible for crime and safety, retained the power to dispense with juries for
petty crimes, such power would not have been warranted for the federal government. In
fact, none of the federal crimes in existence when the Sixth Amendment was ratified was
petty.190
Nor is the Court’s textually inconsistent construction of the Predicate Clause defensible on
policy grounds. It is evident that the Court’s desire to limit the scope of the Predicate
Clause in the counsel and jury trial contexts was motivated by a desire to minimize the
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costs on states.191 The Court could certainly have imposed such a restriction on state
prosecutions under a theory of refined incorporation – it could have expressly chosen to
not incorporate the “in all criminal prosecutions” predicate and instead to require the rights
to jury trial and counsel are fundamental only in subsets of criminal prosecutions in state
courts.192 With respect to federal prosecutions, however, this type of “weighing” had
already been done by the Framers, who “decided that the value of a jury trial far
outweighed its costs for ‘all crimes’ and ‘[i]n all criminal prosecutions.’”193
Perhaps it was this poor textual interpretation and historical record that led Justice Black to
conclude that, by reading a six month limitation into the jury trial right, the Court was
engaging in “judicial mutilation of our written Constitution”194 and simply legislating “that
‘all crimes’ did not mean ‘all crimes,’ but meant only ‘all serious crimes.”195
Since the Court’s entangled reading of the “all criminal prosecutions” clause is neither
textually supported nor historically faithful, the Court should disentangle this clause. This
would mean that all seven procedural rights of the Sixth Amendment, including the rights
to jury trial and counsel, would apply to all federal prosecutions. For state prosecutions,
since the predicate clause need not be incorporated to the states, the Court’s current
limitations on the scope of the rights to jury trial and counsel would remain valid.
B.

THE RIGHT TO COMPULSORY PROCESS

The Sixth Amendment guarantees that in “all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right . . . to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor.”196
While this text speaks plainly to the “process” for calling witnesses to the trial, not to the
regulation of witnesses’ testimony after they come to court, the Court has read the right
more broadly to include the defendant’s right to put on witnesses and the defendant’s right
191
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to testify. As discussed below, this expansive interpretation has resulted in the entangling
of the Sixth Amendment with due process concerns, paradoxically opening the door to a
potentially restrictive and textually inconsistent reading of the Clause in the future.
The entanglement of the Compulsory Process Clause can be traced to the Court’s decision
four decades ago in Washington v. Texas.197 In Washington, the Court was faced with a
Texas statute that imposed a per se bar against the use of testimony by persons who
participated in the crime with the defendant.198 As indicated by Justice Harlan’s
concurring opinion, the Court could have easily resolved this case on due process grounds
because the Fourteenth Amendment has traditionally been the source of constitutional
constraints on a state’s evidentiary rules.199 Indeed, the Court noted that “the most basic
ingredients of due process of law” include the right “to be heard in [one’s] defense,” which
in turn includes “[t]he right to offer the testimony of witnesses.”200 Nevertheless, after
determining that the Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process was applicable to the
States via the Fourteenth Amendment,201 the Court read the Compulsory Process clause
expansively to include not only the right to the “process” for compelling the attendance of
witnesses in court, but also the substantive right to have those witnesses testify.202 As
such, the Court located the right to have witnesses testify in both the Due Process and
Compulsory Process clauses thereby entangling the Sixth Amendment.203
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The Court’s entangled reading of the Compulsory Process Clause contravenes the Clause’s
text and history.204 The Sixth Amendment’s text speaks narrowly of the “process” for
obtaining witnesses – that is, the issuance of subpoenas; it says nothing about the
regulation of the witnesses’ testimony after they come to court. Such a restrictive reading
of the text is consonant with the Clause’s history. The Framers had soundly rejected a
proposal that the compulsory process language be expanded to include the right to a
continuance if the process had been granted but not served – the proposal mustered support
of less than a fifth of the Framers.205 As a Framer noted, “if process was issued, “the
Government did all it could; the remainder must lie in the discretion of the court.””206 The
Washington Court addressed neither the limited nature of the text nor the Clause’s history.
Instead, the Court first engaged in a lengthy, but inapposite, discussion of common law
principles concerning restrictions on the testimony of defense witnesses.207 The Court then
stated that “[t]he Framers of the Constitution did not intend to commit the futile act of
giving to a defendant the right to secure the attendance of witnesses whose testimony he
had no right to use”208 and accordingly struck down the Texas statute. The Court’s
conclusion, however, was misguided because it ignored the role of the Due Process clause
that, as the Court itself had recognized, included the right to have witnesses testify. As a
result, the Framers did not commit a “futile act:” while the Compulsory Process clause
only gave defendants the narrow right to the issuance of subpoenas for the production of
witnesses and documents,209 the Due Process clause granted defendants the ability to use
such testimonial and documentary evidence.210
The Court’s entanglement of the Compulsory Process Clause has also occurred in the
context of a defendant’s right to testify. In Rock v. Arkansas, the Court was called upon to
determine the constitutionality of an Arkansas evidentiary rule that prohibited hypnotically
refreshed testimony.211 The defendant was hypnotized and wanted to take the stand after
her memory had been refreshed.212 Although relying principally on the Due Process
204

The Court’s entangled reading of the Compulsory Process Clause also was inconsistent with the structure
of the Bill of Rights. As the Court had noted, the most elemental notions of due process included the
substantive right to have defense witnesses testify. In locating the same right in the Compulsory Process
clause, the Court failed to give independent meaning to the Fifth/Fourteenth Amendment and the Sixth
Amendment.
205
Joshua Dressler & George C. Thomas, III, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: PRINCIPLES, POLICIES AND
PERSPECTIVES 1192 (3d ed. 2006) (citing 1 Annals of Cong. 756 (1789)).
206
Id.
207
The discussion of common law principles, while relevant to the (due process) question of whether it was
permissible for a state to create per se rules excluding entire classes of defense testimony, was not relevant to
the underlying question of whether the Compulsory Process Clause included two rights: the right to issue
subpoenas and the right to have the witnesses actually testify.
208
388 U.S. at 18.
209
United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30 (1807).
210
This is not to suggest that Due Process grants defendants an unlimited right to have witnesses testify. The
admissibility and use of evidence are governed by state and federal rules of evidence, which in turn are
bounded by due process considerations.
211
483 U.S. 44, 45 (1987).
212
Id. at 46-47.
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Clause to find that the total exclusion of the hypnotic testimony was unconstitutional, the
Court also held that there is a compulsory process right to testify on one’s own behalf.213
Finally, the Court entangled the Compulsory Process Clause in the context of an accused’s
right to offer a defense. In Holmes v. South Carolina, the Court faulted the trial court for
excluding the defendant’s evidence that a third party had committed the crime. 214 Since
the right to be heard is a critical element of due process,215 the Court could have based its
decision on the Due Process clause. But the Court did not do so. Instead, it cited both the
Due Process clause and the Sixth Amendment’s Compulsory Process clause.216
The danger posed by the Court’s entanglement of the Confrontation Clause is illustrated by
Taylor v. Illinois.217 In Taylor, the trial court had excluded a defense witness’ testimony as
a penalty for the defense counsel’s willful violation of a state discovery rule.218 As the
state had argued, the Court could easily have held that the exclusion did not violate the
defendant’s compulsory process right because the defendant was not denied the
government’s assistance in compelling the witness’ attendance at trial.219 Such an
approach would have been consistent with the plain meaning of the text and the Clause’s
history. Instead, the Court adhered to its broad reading of the Clause, reiterating that it
also gives defendants the right to present a defense.220 The Court, however, found that the
Compulsory Process Clause had not been violated because the right to present a defense is
not absolute; it must be balanced against “[t]he integrity of the adversary process, which
depends both on the presentation of reliable evidence and the rejection of unreliable
evidence, the interest in the fair and efficient administration of justice, and the potential
prejudice to the truth-determining function of the trial process.”221 The Court, thus,
incorporated a limitation into a textually unqualified right to compulsory process.
The Court’s incorporation of a limiting principle has opened the door to a future restrictive
reading of the Confrontation Clause. Consistent with current jurisprudence, the Court
213

See id. at 52-53 (arguing that there is also a Fifth Amendment right to testify on one’s own behalf).
547 U.S. 319 (2006).
215
Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. at 18-19 (citing In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948)).
216
Holmes, 547 U.S. at 324 (““Whether rooted directly in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment or in the Compulsory Process or Confrontation clauses of the Sixth Amendment, the
Constitution guarantees criminal defendants ‘a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.’ ””)
(citation omitted).
217
484 U.S. 400 (1988).
218
Id. at 418.
219
This does not mean, however, that the trial court’s actions were constitutionally acceptable. On the
contrary, a credible argument can be made that the Court should have overturned the conviction and ordered
a new trial under a robust reading of the Due Process clause: if the evidence being offered was relevant and
reliable, its exclusion would violate the defendant’s right to present a defense and to be heard, especially
since there were alternate means of addressing any harm from the discovery violation, such as granting a
continuance, and since it was possible to punish the attorney personally for the discovery violation instead of
punishing the client.
220
484 U.S. at 408-09.
221
Id. at 414-15.
214
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could find that a trial court’s refusal to issue a subpoena does not violate the Confrontation
Clause if, using a balancing approach, the trial court had deemed the potential witness to
be unreliable. That is, the same rationale that has allowed the Court to expand the meaning
of the Confrontation Clause turns out to be the means for a potential contraction of the
Clause.
To avoid such a potential undermining of the express, unlimited language of the
Compulsory Process Clause, the Court should disentangle the Sixth Amendment and revert
to a narrow reading of the Compulsory Process clause, leaving the resolution of all
evidentiary issues to the Due Process clause. Under such a reading, while the Compulsory
Process Clause gives defendants the right to the issuance of subpoenas for compelling a
witness’ attendance in court, once that witness shows up, it is the Due Process clause that
addresses whether the witness will be allowed to testify. Although such disentanglement
would not result in a different outcome in any of the Court’s Compulsory Process clause
decisions (because due process principles would support the same resolution by the Court),
it would safeguard against future contraction and lead to a doctrine that is more faithful to
the text and more historically sound.
Such a disentangled approach is reflected in the Court’s decision in Pennsylvania v. Ritchie
where the Court was asked to decide whether the Compulsory Process Clause requires the
state to disclose possible exculpatory evidence.222 The Court chose to resolve the
defendant’s claim using due process principles “[b]ecause the applicability of the Sixth
Amendment to this type of case is unsettled, and because our Fourteenth Amendment
precedents addressing the fundamental fairness of trials establish a clear framework for
review . . . .”223
C.

THE RIGHT TO A PUBLIC TRIAL

The Sixth Amendment provides that “in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a . . . public trial.”224 Despite this unequivocal guarantee,225 the Court has

222

480 U.S. 39, 42-43 (1987).
Id. at 56. The Court added that “[a]lthough we conclude that compulsory process provides no greater
protections in this area than those afforded by due process, we need not decide today whether and how the
guarantees of the Compulsory Process Clause differ from those of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id.
224
U.S. CONST. amend. VI. See Aron Goldschneider, Choose Your Poison: A Comparative Constitutional
Analysis of Criminal Trial Closure v. Witness Disguise in the Context of Protecting Endangered Witnesses at
Trial, 15 GEO. MASON. U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 25, 30, n.22 (2004) (noting that “[t]he public trial right applies to the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment (citing Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148 (1968)).
Goldschneider also notes that the Oliver Court argued that “without exception all courts have held that an
accused is at the very least entitled to have his friends, relatives and counsel present, no matter with what
offense he is charged.” Id. (quoting In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 271-72). See also Amar, Sixth Amendment
First Principles, supra Note 148, at 678 (arguing that under the Anglo-American tradition, a trial that is not
public is no trial at all).
223
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opened the door to the possibility that a trial may be held in closed proceedings over a
defendant’s objection.226 As discussed below, this textually inconsistent, and entirely
avoidable, result stems from an improper entanglement of the Sixth Amendment with Due
Process considerations.
The Court’s entanglement of the Public Trial Clause can be traced to its decision in Waller
v. Georgia, where the Court was asked to consider whether “the accused’s Sixth
Amendment right to a public trial extend[s] to a suppression hearing conducted prior to the
presentation of evidence to the jury[.]”227 The answer should have been a simple “No.”
The Sixth Amendment’s text after all unambiguously states that the right to public
proceedings has to be provided at “trial.” There is nothing in the text that provides for this
right to public proceedings prior to or after a trial.
Instead, in an opinion written for a unanimous Court by Justice Powell, the Court held that
the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial does extend to pre-trial proceedings.228 In
doing so, the Court drew support from a line of First Amendment cases that recognized
that the press and public had a qualified First Amendment right to attend a criminal trial,
including voir dire proceedings during jury selection.229 The Court then used a simple
syllogism: Since the press and public have a qualified right to attend pretrial suppression
hearings under the First Amendment and since the Sixth Amendment public trial right is at
least as protective as the First Amendment rights of the press and public, therefore the
Sixth Amendment public trial right applies to suppression hearings.230 The Court also
noted that its holding is consistent with the purposes of the right to a public trial, namely
that it allows the public to see that the defendant “is fairly dealt with and not unjustly
condemned,” that it encourages the “judge and prosecutor [to] carry out their duties
responsibly,” and that it “encourages witnesses to come forward and discourages
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This is not to say that all parts of trials must be open to the public and press. “[C]ertain portions of a trial,
such as sidebar conferences and in-chambers conferences, may routinely be kept confidential.” Sixth
Amendment at Trial, 35 Geo. L.J. Ann. Rev. Crim. Proc. 608, 614 (2006).
226
A corollary issue raised by the public trial guarantee is whether a trial can be held in open proceedings
over a defendant’s objection – that is, whether defendants have unlimited ability to waive public trials.
While the Court has held that trials may indeed be held open over the defendant’s objection, this
jurisprudence is not inconsistent with Constitutional text. This is because the issue implicates not only a
defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights but also the First Amendment rights of the press and the public. In light
of competing textual mandates, the Court properly held that a resolution of the issue should be predicated on
a balancing of the two Constitutional provisions. Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 35 (1965) (citing
United States v. Kobli, 172 F.2d 919, 924 (3rd Cir. 1949).
227
467 U.S. 39, 43 (1984).
228
Id. at 48.
229
Id. at 44-45 (citing Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of California, 464 U.S. 501 (1984); Globe
Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court for Norfolk County, 457 U.S. 596 (1982); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v.
Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980); Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979).).
230
Id. at 44-46 (citations omitted).
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perjury.”231 Finally, the Court pointed to the similarities in benefits from open proceedings
at suppression hearings and trials.232
Completely absent from the Court’s reasoning was any discussion of the plain limiting
language of the Sixth Amendment that the right is to a public “trial.” This is not surprising
because the text proves to be an insurmountable obstacle. Since the right to a public
proceeding is limited to a “trial,” the only way to ground the decision in the text would be
to argue that a “trial” includes pre-trial proceedings. Such a position, however, is not
tenable. In addition to the right to a public trial, two other Sixth Amendment rights are
expressly limited to the context of trials – the rights to speedy trial and jury trial. It is
unimaginable that the Court would agree that these rights could be extended to pre-trial
proceedings, by holding either that defendants are entitled to have pre-trial proceedings
occur in a speedy manner or that pre-trial proceedings ought to be conducted before juries.
The only alternative for the Court would have been to find some limiting principle that
would allow it to extend one trial-specific right to pre-trial proceedings while not
extending the others. There is no such limiting principle. Simply put, not only is there no
textual support in the Sixth Amendment for the Court’s decision, but the text of the Sixth
Amendment actually undermines the Court’s holding.
This is not to say that there are no constitutional bases for requiring that pre-trial or posttrial proceedings be open. There are. These can be found in the Due Process clauses of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court, relying on practically the same grounds
already laid out in its opinion, could have held that Due Process, rather than the right to a
public trial, requires that suppression hearings and other pre-trial proceedings be conducted
in the open.233 After all, the public trial interests identified by the Court – ensuring that
defendants are dealt with fairly, encouraging proper conduct by judges and prosecutors,
encouraging witnesses to come forward and testify truthfully234 – are all consonant with
fundamental due process interests of ensuring a fair hearing before a neutral
decisionmaker.235
This argument – that the Court erred in locating its ruling in the Sixth Amendment instead
of the Fourteenth Amendment – is not a matter of mere semantics. There is a real danger
in the Court’s entangling a due process issue with the Sixth Amendment. This is because
231

Id. at 46 (citations omitted)
Id. at 46-47. See also Lewis F. Weakland, Confusion in the Courthouse: The Legacy of the Gannett and
Richmond Newpapers Public Right to Access Cases, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 603, 615 (1986) (arguing that the
Court employed a functional analysis without even considering whether pretrial suppression hearings were
traditionally open).
233
While it is true that a free-standing Fourteenth Amendment due process claim was not raised by the
parties, the Court has in the past resolved cases on grounds not raised by the parties. In any event, the Court
could have asked the parties for further briefing on this issue had it wanted to.
234
Waller, 467 U.S. at 46.
235
See Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 727 (1992) (“The failure to accord an accused a fair hearing violates
even the minimal standards of due process.”) (citation omitted); In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)
(“A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process.”)
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the Court has adopted the First Amendment ‘balancing of interests’ jurisprudence in
holding that there are circumstances in which the right to public pre-trial proceedings may
be overridden.236 That is, notwithstanding the fact that the Sixth Amendment does not in
any way qualify the right to a public trial, the Court held that pre-trial proceedings may be
closed in certain circumstances. Now, had the Court limited this qualification of the right
to a public hearing to pre-trial proceedings and kept the right to public trial unfettered,
there would have been little issue. But, the Court drew no such line. Therefore,
notwithstanding the absence of any limiting language in the text of the Sixth Amendment,
the Court’s balancing of interests approach allows for a closure of trials over the
defendant’s objection as much as it allows the closure of pre-trial proceedings.237 The fear
of this textually inconsistent construction of the Sixth Amendment is not a merely
theoretical concern. Already, state and lower federal courts have applied the First
Amendment standard to close portions of trials in clear contravention of the plain language
of the Sixth Amendment.238

236

Waller, 467 U.S. at 47 (“[W]e hold that under the Sixth Amendment any closure of a suppression hearing
over the objections of the accused must meet the tests set out in Press-Enterprise and its predecessors.”). In
the First Amendment context, the Court has held that the presumption that the trial be open to the press and
public may be overridden “by an overriding interest based on findings that closure is essential to preserve
higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.” Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (PressEnterprise I), 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984). The Court has subsequently added that there are “two
complementary consideration” – “whether the place and process have historically been open to the press and
general public” and “whether public access plays a significant positive role in the functioning of the
particular process in question.” Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of California for Riverside County
(Press-Enterprise II), 478 U.S. 1, 8 (1986).
237
See Thomas G. Stacy, The Constitution in Conflict: Espionage Prosecutions, the Right to Present a
Defense, and the States Secret Privilege, 58 U. COLO. L. REV. 177, 251 (1987) (“Waller implicitly holds that,
as in the first amendment context, a prospective witness’ or juror’s privacy interests may overcome a
defendant’s qualified sixth amendment right to a public trial in certain circumstances.”). Instead of this
textually inconsistent approach, the Court should recognize that defendants have an absolute right to insist on
a public trial and that the denial of this right would be a structural error, one that is not amenable to harmless
error analysis. See State v. Washington, 755 N.E.2d 422, 426 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001) (“The violation of the
constitutional right to a public trial is a structural error, not subject to harmless error analysis.” (citations
omitted)).
238
See, e.g., Ayala v. Speckard, 131 F.3d 62, 69-72 (2d Cir. 1997) (employing the Press-Enterprise I
standard to uphold the trial court’s closure of the trial during the testimony of a witness); State v.
Washington, 755 N.E.2d 422, 424-25 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001) (ordering a new trial after finding that the trial
court improperly applied the Press-Enterprise I standard to close the courtroom during the testimony of one
witness at trial). See also Sixth Amendment at Trial, 35 Geo. L.J. Ann. Rev. Crim. Proc. 608, 612-14 (2006)
(“Federal courts have expanded the applicability of the Press-Enterprise I test beyond the voir dire and trial
stages. . . . Courts have applied the Press Enterprise I test to closures of suppression hearings and post-trial
examinations of jurors for potential misconduct. Courts have also applied the Press Enterprise I test to the
sealing of documents, including those that support search warrants and plea agreements, as well as
documents stemming from electronic surveillance. In addition, courts have applied the Press Enterprise I test
to the sealing of records of criminal proceedings, including post-trial motions.”); Goldschneider, supra Note
224, at 37 (“Closure of criminal trials is New York is exceedingly commonplace . . . .”); Randolph N.
Jonakait, Secret Testimony and Public Trials in New York, 42 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 407, 407 (1998) (“New
York leads the country in denying public trials.”).
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The danger stemming from the Court’s introduction of a new balancing of interests is
accentuated by the factors that are involved in the balancing process. As noted earlier, not
all balancing of interests are alien to the Sixth Amendment. For instance, when a
defendant seeks to waive the right to a public trial, there arises a conflict between two
constitutional provisions – the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights and the First
Amendment rights of the public and the press to attend trials. In such circumstances, a
balancing of competing constitutional interests is unavoidable. The Court’s decision in
Waller, however, involves balancing of a different type. Under the Waller framework, a
defendant’s right to a public trial may be denied after balancing that constitutional right
against non-constitutional interests.239
Thus, the unnecessary entanglement of the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial with
due process considerations has opened the door to a contraction of an otherwise robust
procedural protection afforded by the Sixth Amendment. The Court’s failure to ground the
right to public pre-trial proceedings in the due process clause led it needlessly to locate that
right in the Sixth Amendment. While the Court’s concurrent adoption of First Amendment
balancing of interests jurisprudence to allow for the closure of pre-trial proceedings in
some circumstances would not have posed a problem under due process analysis,240 its use
in the Sixth Amendment is fundamentally at odds with the unqualified text of the
Amendment and leads to an undermining of a critical safeguard of liberty.
D.

THE RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL

The Sixth Amendment guarantees all defendants the right to a speedy trial.241 Despite the
fact that this text speaks solely to the timeliness of the trial, the Court has held that,
notwithstanding the length or reasons for the delay, there may likely be no violation of the
right to a speedy trial unless a defendant has been prejudiced by the delay.242 As discussed
239

As the Waller Court recognized, First Amendment cases make clear “that the right to an open trial may
give way in certain cases to other rights or interests, such as the defendant's right to a fair trial or the
government's interest in inhibiting disclosure of sensitive information.” 467 U.S. at 45. The Court has also
clarified that in this balancing process, “the interests of those other than the accused may be implicated. The
protection of victims of sex crimes from the trauma and embarrassment of public scrutiny may justify closing
certain aspects of a criminal proceeding.” Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 9 n.2.
240
Due process considerations have traditionally involved the weighing of all interests, including nonconstitutional interests. See, e.g., Cruzan by Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279
(1990) (“[D]etermining that a person has a “liberty interest” under the Due Process Clause does not end the
inquiry; “whether respondent's constitutional rights have been violated must be determined by balancing his
liberty interests against the relevant state interests.”); Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional Institution,
Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985) (“The requirements of due process are flexible and depend on a
balancing of the interests affected by the relevant government action.”).
241
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
242
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 519 (1972). The Court also held that another factor involved in
determining a speedy trial claim is whether the defendant asserted that right. Id. As the Court recognized,
the inclusion of this factor constitutes a departure from the general rule against the use of silence to infer
waiver of a constitutional right. Id. For example, the Court has held that the right to counsel applies
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below, this textually inconsistent result is a consequence of an improper entanglement of
the Sixth Amendment.
Prior to entanglement, the Court held that the speedy trial right was meant to guard against
“undue and oppressive incarceration” and the “anxiety and concern accompanying public
accusation.”243 To protect this “impairment of liberty,” federal courts, prior to
incorporation, imposed a mechanical rule for speedy trial violations.244 This rule applied
irrespective of the reasons for the delay or whether the defendant was prejudiced.245
However, during the early years of the Burger Court, the Court in Barker v. Wingo adopted
a four-part balancing test and altered the focus of the speedy trial right from the protection
of liberty to the preservation of reliable and accurate verdicts.246 In Barker, the Court held
that the delay of five and one-half years between the period of arrest and trial did not
violate the defendant’s Sixth Amendment speedy trial right.247 The Court’s remarkable248
finding that a multiple-year delay was speedy lies might be explained by two factors. First,
Barker is a case where “bad facts make bad law.”249 The first section of the Justice
Powell’s majority opinion begins with a summary of the crime: “On July 20, 1958, in
Christian County, Kentucky, an elderly couple was beaten to death by intruders wielding
an iron tire tool.”250 Second, although suggesting that the remedy for a violation of the
right to a speedy trial—dismissal of the indictment with prejudice251—is an
“unsatisfactorily severe remedy,” the Barker Court nevertheless accepted that that “it is the
only possible remedy.”252 To avoid the possibility that a defendant convicted of a brutal
murder would walk free, the Court had to construct a constitutional justification, which
came from the adoption of a due process prejudice requirement.253
regardless of the defendant’s request for the assistance of counsel. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387,
404 (1977) (“[T]he right to counsel does not depend upon a request by the defendant.”); Carnley v. Cochran,
369 U.S. 506, 513 (1962) (“[W]here the assistance of counsel is a constitutional requisite, the right to be
furnished counsel does not depend on a request.”) See also Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)
(“‘[C]ourts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver’ of fundamental constitutional rights and []
we ‘do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights.’”) (citation omitted). Since the use of
this factor does not involve entanglement issues, a discussion of its merits is beyond the scope of this Article.
243
United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320 (1971).
244
See Thomas III, supra Note 3, at 153 (discussing United States v. Fox, 3 Mont. 512 (1880)).
245
Id.
246
Barker, 407 U.S. at 530-33.
247
407 U.S. at 514.
248
See Anthony G. Amsterdam, Speedy Criminal Trial: Rights and Remedies, 27 STAN. L. REV. 525, 538
(1975) (“To debate the question whether the sixth amendment has been violated in such egregious cases as
these . . . is itself to make a feeble farce of the amendment.”)
249
See Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 659 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting that “bad facts
make bad law.”).
250
Barker, 407 U.S. at 516.
251
See Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434, 438 (1973) (holding that dismissal of the indictment is the
remedy for a violation of the speedy trial right).
252
Barker, 407 U.S. 522.
253
Commentators have noted that the intersection of these two factors may well explain why the Court held
that a five and one-half year period did not violate the defendant’s right to a speedy trial. Thomas III, supra
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Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Powell began by asserting that the speedy trial right
is “generically different” from any other constitutional right.254 The uniqueness of the
right, according to Justice Powell, lies in its vagueness, amorphous nature, remedy, and the
fact that the public benefits from the right adversely to the defendant.255 The Sixth
Amendment, however, “contains a number of items which the defendant might willingly
forego and upon which the state might insist.”256 The truer sense of the uniqueness to
which Justice Powell refers is the remedy, which he finds “unsatisfactory when viewed in
the light of the ‘amorphous quality of the right.’”257
Prior to setting out the standard for a speedy trial violation, Justice Powell rejected two
“rigid” attempts made by lower courts to provide certainty to the otherwise “slippery”
right.258 The first suggested approach would require the Court to adopt a mechanical time
limit, which Justice Powell rejected out of hand, as it would require the Court to “engage
in legislative or rulemaking activity.”259 The second suggested approach was the
“demand-waiver doctrine,” which would require waiver unless the defendant demands a
speedy trial.260 Justice Powell also rejected this suggestion as inconsistent with Court’s
holdings that waiver of a constitutional right may not be waived without consent.261
Although rejecting these two approaches, the Court nonetheless incorporated each in its
four-part balancing standard.262
Under the adopted Barker standard, the consideration of a violation is “triggered” by a
“presumptively prejudicial” lengthy delay.263
Whether the length of delay is
presumptively prejudicial will, according to the Court, vary depending on the “peculiar
circumstances of the case.”264 If the length triggers this presumption, a court must then
consider the reason for the delay.265 Next, a court must consider whether the defendant
asserts the right, because, as Justice Powell argues, the more that a defendant is prejudiced

Note 3, at 227-28 (“Apparently recognizing the difficulty in classifying as ‘speedy’ a trial that occurs five
and one-half years after Barker was arrested, the unanimous Court spoke mostly in terms of whether the
delay caused doubt about the accuracy of the outcome, about whether the defendant’s case was prejudiced by
the delay.”).
254
Barker, 407 U.S. at 519.
255
Id. at 519-22.
256
See generally H. Richard Uviller, Barker v. Wingo: Speedy Trial Gets a Fast Shuffle, 72 COLUM. L. REV.
1376, 1379 (1972) (calling into question the asserted uniqueness of the speedy trial right).
257
Id. at 1381.
258
Barker, 407 U.S. at 522.
259
Id. at 523.
260
Id. at 525.
261
Id.
262
Id. at 530.
263
Baker, 407 U.S. at 530.
264
Barker, 407 U.S. at 530-31.
265
Id. at 531.
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by the delay, the more likely she will make a demand for a speedy trial.266 Finally, a court
should consider whether the delay prejudiced the defense.267
The adoption of the prejudice requirement signaled a radical shift in the Court’s speedy
trial jurisprudence. As noted above, prior to Barker the Court had held that the purpose of
the speedy trial right is to protect a defendant’s liberty interests.268 Although Justice
Powell acknowledges this purpose, he nevertheless claims that “the most serious” interest
is to “limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired,” which if not protected,
“skews the fairness of the entire system” and affects the outcome.269 Prejudice, however,
is “a rationale that has as its goal accuracy rather than simply the provision of the ‘speedy
trial’ the Sixth Amendment guarantees.”270 By relying on “accuracy” and “prejudice,”
therefore, the Court entangled the Sixth Amendment speedy trial right with traditional due
process concerns.
A more faithful interpretation of the speedy trial right would require eliminating Barker’s
prejudice requirement.271 Such an approach is suggested by Justice Souter’s majority and
Justice Thomas’ dissenting opinions in Doggett v. United States.272 In Doggett, the Court
found that the defendant’s Sixth Amendment speedy trial right was violated when,
unbeknownst to the defendant, more than eight years lapsed between the time of his
indictment and the time of his arrest.273 Writing for the majority, Justice Souter relied on
both the length between indictment and arrest and the government’s negligence in
prosecuting the defendant.274 Although the defendant was unable to show specific
prejudice from the delay, the Court made its holding consistent with Barker by
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Id. at 531-32.
Id. at 532.
268
See supra text accompanying Note 243.
269
Id.
270
Thomas III, supra Note 3, at 163.
271
Professor Thomas has a similar thesis in which in call for disentangling the Sixth Amendment speedy
trial right from the Due Process Clause. Thomas, supra Note 3, at 231. However, Professor Thomas argues
that this disentanglement should only occur at federal trials, as opposed to state trials, which he argues should
be decided solely under the Due Process Clause. Id. at 229. In other words, Professor Thomas proposes that
the same procedural right have different meanings in federal courts and in state courts. This Article suggests
instead that each of the Sixth amendment’s seven procedural provisions means the same in any context. The
Article, does, however, suggest that the predicate clause preceding the seven procedural protections in the
Sixth Amendment, which speaks only to the scope of the rights not to their substantive meaning, need not
have been incorporated along with the procedural right. So, for example, it would have been proper for the
Court to hold that the right to counsel applies to all federal prosecutions as the text of the sixth Amendment
demand, but only applies to state prosecutions for felonies and those misdemeanors that result in the
imposition of a term of imprisonment because, under due process, the right to counsel is only critical to
fundamental fairness in these state court proceedings.
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“invent[ing] a presumptive prejudice arising from a delay of that length,”275 which, Justice
Souter argued, “compromises the reliability of a trial in ways that neither party can prove
or, for that matter, identify.”276 Justice Thomas, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice Scalia in dissent, however, proposed a more fundamental shift in the Court’s
Speedy Trial jurisprudence. They argued that the prejudice requirement, which is more
properly the concern of the Due Process Clause,277 should be eliminated and that the
protection of liberty be restored as the principal protection of the speedy trial.278
Under a disentangled reading of the Speedy Trial clause, therefore, a violation would rest
on the showing that the state failed to prosecute an accused279 in a speedy fashion and the
reason for the delay was not prompted by the defendant’s request.280 Once a defendant
makes this showing, the burden should shift to the prosecution to show that the violation
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Such a test would have the virtue of comporting
with other Sixth Amendment rights and mitigating the seemingly unjustifiable remedy of
dismissing an indictment with prejudice. Moreover, by removing the prejudice
requirement, the Court could restore the plain meaning of the right to a speedy trial and
disentangle the speedy trial right from the Due Process Clause, which would apply solely
to preaccusation delays.281
E.

THE RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION

The Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy
the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.”282 This Confrontation
Clause has been understood to involve at its core four procedural safeguards, including the
right to a face-to-face confrontation.283 The Court, however, has held that the right to faceto-face confrontation is not absolute and that public policy considerations may supersede
the constitutional right in some circumstances.284 As discussed below, this elevation of
275
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See id. at 660-61 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Ultimately, Justice Thomas would have denied relief because
the defendant suffered no harm to his liberty interest. Id. at 666 n.4.
279
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public policy over the plain text of the Sixth Amendment has been the result of an
entanglement of the Confrontation Clause with due process concerns of reliability of the
verdict.
The groundwork for the Court’s entanglement of this aspect of the Confrontation Clause
was laid in the Court’s decision in Coy v. Iowa.285 In Coy, the Court considered a statute
that permitted a court to place a screen between the victim of sexual abuse and the
defendant that, once adjustments to the lighting were made, allowed the defendant to see
the witness but the witness not to see the defendant.286 Arguing that the “irreducible literal
meaning of the Clause” is to ensure face-to-face confrontation, the Court held that the use
of the screen violated the Confrontation Clause.287 While Justice O’Connor wrote a
concurring opinion recognizing exceptions to this rule,288 the majority opinion by Justice
Scalia noted that “[w]e leave for another day, however, the question whether any
exceptions exist.”289
Two years later, in Maryland v. Craig, the Court directly addressed exceptions to the
Confrontation Clause’s requirement of face-to-face confrontation.290 In Craig, the Court
was asked to decide the constitutionality of a Maryland statute that permitted the trial
judge, after finding that the witness would be traumatized by testifying in open court, to
allow that witness, a victim of child abuse, to testify in a separate room. 291 In addition,
although the defendant was excluded from that room, attorneys from both sides were
permitted to question the witness and the witness’ testimony was televised to the
courtroom through a one-way closed circuit television.292 Writing for the majority, Justice
O’Connor held that the Maryland statute did not violate the Confrontation Clause.293
Justice O’Connor stated that the Confrontation Clause expresses only a “preference”294 for
face-to-face confrontation and that the underlying purpose of such an encounter and of the
other three elements of the Confrontation Clause (oath taking, cross-examination, and jury
observance of witness demeanor) is to ensure reliability of the verdict.295 Justice
O’Connor concluded, therefore, that if the trial is reliable, then a strict requirement of all of
these elements would needlessly impede important public policies.
The Court’s opinion in Craig, which used public policy considerations to limit the scope of
an otherwise textually and historically unbounded constitutional provision, has been the
285
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subject of considerable criticism. Justice Scalia issued one of his more scathing dissents in
Craig. He attacked the majority’s analysis, which he argued “abstracts from the right to its
purposes, and then eliminates the right.”296 Commentators have argued that Justice
O’Connor’s opinion in Craig tears the presumption of innocence cloak;297 misses the forest
for the trees by improperly balancing the costs of wrongful conviction against the benefits
of eliminating face-to-face confrontation;298 and fails to provide a narrowly tailored
exception for state interests.299
More importantly, however, the Court’s analysis has led to the entanglement of the Sixth
Amendment. As Justice Scalia pointed out in his dissenting opinion, “the Confrontation
Clause does not guarantee reliable evidence; it guarantees specific trial procedures that
were thought to assure reliable evidence, undeniably among which was ‘face-to-face’
confrontation.”300 Reliability, on the other hand, is quintessentially a due process
concern.301
Disentangling the Confrontation Clause by reverting to the bright-line requirement of faceto-face confrontation would restore the plain meaning and full protection of the
Confrontation Clause.302 The prospect for such disentanglement appears more likely given
296
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the Court’s recent decision in Crawford v. Washington where Justice Scalia wrote, while
“the [Confrontation] Clause’s ultimate goal is to ensure reliability of evidence, []it is a
procedural rather than a substantive guarantee. It commands, not that evidence be reliable,
but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner . . . .”303 This principle is equally
applicable to the Court’s decision in Craig.
F.

THE RIGHT TO ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

The Sixth Amendment provides that all defendants have the right to assistance of
counsel304 and this right to counsel has been recognized as being “the right to the effective
assistance of counsel.”305 This is because an ineffective counsel is “not functioning as the
‘counsel’ guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.”306 Prior to the incorporation of the right
to counsel, the Court had used the Fourteenth Amendment to require that, in cases where
due process required the appointment of counsel, counsel provide effective assistance.307
Since the Court’s landmark decision in Gideon v. Wainwright, the denial of effective
assistance has been recognized as a violation of the Sixth Amendment.308 As discussed
below, however, the Court has entangled this right to effective assistance by requiring that
defendants demonstrate – not for purposes of determining whether relief is warranted once
a violation is proved, but for purposes of determining whether the constitutional provision
in fact has been violated – that the attorney’s performance affected the reliability of the
verdict.
During the last years of the Burger Court, the Supreme Court elaborated on the elements of
the right to effective assistance of counsel in Strickland v. Washington, establishing a twopronged standard for ineffective assistance of council claims. The first prong requires the
defendant to “show that counsel’s performance was deficient,” and provides that counsel’s
performance be evaluated using “prevailing professional norms,” that there should be a
“strong presumption” of counsel’s reasonableness, and that, in reviewing strategic
decisions, courts should apply a “heavy measure of deference to counsel’s judgments.”309
While much criticism has been directed as this prong of the Strickland test,310 it is not the
focus of this Article because it does not involve any issue of entanglement.
should apply without exception in all federal cases, but properly can be required only in a subset of
prosecutions in state courts.
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Rather, it is the second prong of the Strickland standard that is the source of the
entanglement of the right to counsel. This prong requires the defendant to show that
counsel’s deficiency was prejudicial to the defense.311 While prejudice may be presumed
in some limited cases, as a general matter the defendant must “affirmatively prove
prejudice,” which requires the defendant to demonstrate that “there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would
have been different.”312
Strickland’s prejudice prong is problematic for purposes of this Article because it
entangles the Sixth Amendment with traditional due process concerns. Writing for the
majority, Justice O’Connor stated that since “the Sixth Amendment right to counsel exists,
and is needed, in order to protect the fundamental right to a fair trial,”313 to satisfy the
prejudice prong the defendant must show “counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive
the defendant of a fair trial.”314 This reasoning led to the entanglement of the Sixth
Amendment not only because the right to a fair trial has been seen as a distinctly due
process right,315 but also because, rather than understanding a fair trial as being one in
which the procedures used were fair, Justice O’Connor defined a fair trial as “a trial whose
result is reliable.”316 Therefore, to establish a Sixth Amendment claim, the Court required
defendants to demonstrate the unreliability of the verdict or sentence,317 a quintessentially
due process consideration.318
This entanglement has led to a textually challenged and historically unsound construction
of the right to counsel. While the text of the Sixth Amendment provides that the assistance
of counsel be provided to defendants “in all criminal prosecutions,” the second prong
counsel are unpersuasive and “[a]ppropriately rigorous professional standards for appraising counsel's
conduct should not discourage the type of attorney one wants to attract from accepting in forma pauperis
assignments.”); Meredith J. Duncan, The (So-Called) Liability of Criminal Defense Attorneys, 2002 B.Y.U.
L. REV. 1 (2002) (arguing that it has weakened criminal defense lawyering and that Strickland’s
presumption’s are too burdensome).
311
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313
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effectively means that the assistance of counsel need only be provided in those
prosecutions where there is a reasonable probability that defendants will receive a
favorable verdict at guilt or sentencing.
In addition, the Court’s entangled approach has reduced the prescriptive value of the right
to counsel. Whatever might be said of the Court’s approach in Strickland from an ex post
perspective, the approach is deeply problematic from an ex ante perspective. By failing to
require an ex ante inquiry into whether “the defense is institutionally equipped to litigate as
effectively as the prosecution”319 and by allowing reviewing courts to avoid assessing
counsel’s competence by considering prejudice before performance,320 the Court has
minimized the guidance provided by the right to counsel jurisprudence to members of the
bar.321
Moreover, limiting the right to counsel to those defendants who might be innocent is
inconsistent with the fact the “Framers of the Bill of Rights intended them to be formidable
barriers to the successful federal prosecution of criminal defendants, whether guilty or
innocent.”322
It is not surprising then that the Court’s approach has been roundly criticized for permitting
horrendous lawyering;323 for making it difficult for defendants to prove violations in those
cases where counsel failed miserably;324 for being too forgiving of failures to investigate or
present mitigating evidence and for producing arbitrary reviews in capital cases;325 for
making putting reviewing courts in the difficult position of having to determine from a
cold record whether an outcome during the penalty phase would have been different;326 for
creating an framework that allows reviewing courts to conflate the trial and sentencing
phases under the prejudice analysis;327 for creating an almost “insurmountable hurdle for

319

See Donald A. Dripps, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: The Case for an Ex Ante Parity Standard, 88 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 242, 243 (1997). See generally Bruce A. Green, Lethal Fiction: The Meaning of
“Counsel” in the Sixth Amendment, 78 IOWA L. REV. 433 (1993).
320
See id.; Martin C. Calhoun, Note, How to Thread the Needle: Towards a Checklist Based Standard for
Evaluating Ineffective assistance of Counsel Claims, 77 GEO. L.J. 413, 458 app. (1998); WAYNE R. LAFAVE,
3 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 11.10(d) (2d ed. 1999).
321
See Duncan, supra Note 310, at 6, 20.
322
Thomas III, supra Note 3, at 152.
323
See, e.g., Geimer, supra Note 318, at 148; Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence
Not for the Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835 (1994).
324
See, e.g., Richard Klein, The Constitutionalization of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 58 MD. L. REV.
1433, 1467 (1999).
325
See Amy R. Murphy, Note, The Constitutional Failure of the Strickland Standard in Capital Cases Under
the Eighth Amendment, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 179 (2000). But see generally Wiggins v. Smith, 539
U.S. 510 (2003); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420 (2000).
326
See Jeffery Levinson, Note, Don’t Let Sleeping Lawyers Lie: Raising the Standard for Effective
Assistance of Counsel, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 147, 169 (2001).
327
See id. at 170.

44

THE SIXTH AMENDMENT’S TEXTUAL CORE

defendants claiming ineffective assistance”;328 and for overemphasizing factual
innocence.329
The prospect for disentangling the right to counsel are bright330 in light of the Court’s
recent decision in United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, a case in which the Court was asked to
“decide whether a trial court’s erroneous deprivation of a criminal defendant’s choice of
counsel entitles him to a reversal of his conviction.”331 In response to the government’s
claim that the defendant should be required to show that the substituted counsel’s
performance prejudiced the defendant, i.e. that the defendant did not receive a fair trial,
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, answered that the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel of choice, “commands, not that a trial be fair, but that a particular guarantee of
fairness be provided--to wit, that the accused be defended by the counsel he believes to be
best.”332 Justice Scalia further argued for disentanglement by claiming that “the right at
stake here is the right to counsel of choice, not the right to a fair trial; and that right was
violated because the deprivation of counsel was erroneous.”333
In his Gonzalez-Lopez opinion, Justice Scalia also criticizes the Court’s earlier method of
outlining the limits of certain Sixth Amendment rights from their purpose to provide a fair
trial.334 As examples, Justice Scalia cites Ohio v. Roberts, in which the Court reasoned that
the Confrontation Clause was not violated as long as the purpose of ensuring reliability
was satisfied,335 and Maryland v. Craig, in which the Court “abstract[ed] from the right to
its purposes, and then eliminate[d] the right.”336 Justice Scalia concedes that “the purpose
of the rights set forth in [the Sixth] Amendment is to ensure a fair trial.”337 However, he
concludes that “it does not follow that the rights can be disregarded so long as the trial is,
on the whole, fair.”338 Instead, the Sixth Amendment rights have independent meaning
and significance distinct from their purpose—the right to a fair trial.339
In the ineffective assistance context, disentanglement would mean that prejudice should be
eliminated from the showing necessary to establish a violation of the right to counsel.340
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Instead, a showing of ineffective assistance of counsel should rest solely on demonstrating
that the counsel’s performance was constitutionally deficient.341 Once the defendant has
made such a showing, the court should then address the issue of whether relief should be
granted using its traditional approach to these issues. That is, the court should apply the
harmless error rule set forth in Chapman v. California.342 It bears emphasizing here that
although the Chapman rule normally applies only on direct appeal, it should apply to all
initial claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, irrespective of the procedural posture of
the case.343 This is because courts have not only held that defendants may properly bring
an ineffective assistance claim for the first time on collateral attack,344 but in fact have
required that such claims not be raised until collateral proceedings.345 Once the Chapman
standard has been applied at the first collateral review, whether in state post-conviction or
in federal habeas corpus proceedings, then courts could use the standard set forth in Brecht
v. Abramson.346
Using this approach will not only result in a textually sound and historically grounded
disentangled reading of the right to counsel, but it would also lead to a proper re-aligning
of the burdens of proof. While the Strickland approach places the burden on the defendant
for establishing that the counsel’s deficient performance was prejudicial, under the
harmless error approach, the burden would be on the government. 347 Such an approach
would be consistent with the Court’s general approach to other non-structural
constitutional errors,348 including non-structural violations of the right to counsel in other
contexts.349
CONCLUSION
The Sixth Amendment, framed amidst deep misgivings about a potentially oppressive
central government, mandates that the federal government provide all defendants seven
fundamental procedural protections. Over the course of the past few decades, the Supreme
Court’s expansive and restrictive readings of the Sixth Amendment have led to
constructions that are inconsistent with the Amendment’s text. These problematic
341
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readings, caused by entanglements of the Sixth Amendment with the Due Process clause,
have led to diminished procedural protections against infringement of individual liberty.
The Court’s recent Sixth Amendment jurisprudence bears signs of the Court’s willingness
to disentangle the Sixth Amendment and return to a textually grounded reading of the
Amendment. Were the Court to continue this project and disentangle of the various
entanglements identified in this Article, it would do much to restore the Sixth
Amendment’s robust role in protecting individual liberty as envisioned when it was
adopted.
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APPENDIX A
Federal Crimes at the Time the Sixth Amendment was Ratified350

Crime
Treason

Murder
Piracy and felony
Accessories to piracy
Before the fact
Forgery and
counterfeiting
Rescue of a person
convicted of a capital
crime
Misprision of treason
Misprision of murder or
felony

Manslaughter
Accessories to piracy
after the fact
Confederacy to become
pirates
Maiming on Unites
States’ Property or on the
high seas
Stealing or falsifying a
record or process
Perjury

350

1790 Punishment Current Punishment
Death; 5 years,
Death
$10,000
First degree: Death or
life; Second degree:
Death
Term or life

Current Code
18 U.S.C. §
2381

Death

Life

18 U.S.C. §
1111
18 U.S.C. §
1651

Death

n/a

n/a

Death

20 years

18 U.S.C. § 471

Death

25 years, fine

7 years, $1,000

7 years, fine

18 U.S.C. § 753
18 U.S.C. §
2382

3 years, $500

3 years, $1,000

3 years, fine
Voluntary: 10 years,
fine; Involuntary: 6
years, fine

3 years, $500

n/a

3 years, $1,000

3 years, fine

7 years, $1,000
7 years, $5,000,
39 stripes
3 years, $800, 1
hour in the pillory

20 years, fine

Crimes Act of 1790, ch. 9, 1 Stat. 112

5 years, fine
5 years, fine

18 U.S.C. § 4
18 U.S.C. §
1112
n/a
18 U.S.C. §
1657

18 U.S.C. § 114
18 U.S.C. §
1506
18 U.S.C. §
1621
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Crime
Obstruction of process
Rescue of a person before
trial
Suing an ambassador or
foreign minister
Violation of safe conduct,
or Violence to
ambassador or minister
Larceny on United States’
property or on the high
seas

Receiving stolen goods

Bribery of a judge

1790 Punishment Current Punishment
1 year, $300

1 year, fine

Current Code
18 U.S.C. §
1509

1 year, $500
3 years, fine at
court’s discretion

5 years, fine

18 U.S.C. § 752

n/a

n/a

3 years, fine
5 years if more than
$1,000; 1 year if
$1,000 or less.
3 years if more than
$1,000; 1 year if
$1,000 or less.

18 U.S.C. § 112

3 years, fine at
court’s discretion
4 times the value
of goods, 39
stripes
4 times the value
of goods, 39
stripes
Fine and
imprisonment at
the discretion of
the judge

18 U.S.C. § 661

18 U.S.C. § 662

1 year if not willful; 5 18 U.S.C. §§
years if willful.
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